From combat crew handbook, 3^rd Division:

• The intelligence officers of your Group have the responsibility of “Knowing the Hun”. Their job is to see that you get information which will help you to get past enemy defences, identify the target and return safely to your base.

• The German Air Force and its tactics, observation methods, escape procedures, aircraft recognition and target identification are all subjects that will be covered in class room work. In addition, just prior to a mission you will be briefed on the target, its location and importance, German fighters, Flak, and all defences you will encounter on that particular operation.

General purpose of the mission:

• The current weather forecast indicates that tomorrow will be the day for which the Allied high command has been waiting ever since the German counter-offensive began eight days ago – a day that will permit maximum employment of our air power. The Eighth Air Force will put nearly 2,000 heavy bombers into the air, with 3^rd Division furnishing 856 of these. In addition, the RAF heavies will be attacking four airfields in the Cologne-Ruhr area, while the medium bombers and the Tactical Air Forces will be out in full strength on close support targets. This promises to be the largest scale aerial operation in history. Eighth Air Force’s effort will be some 300 aircraft in excess of its previous record operation.

• Although the Second Division will be attacking fourteen tactical targets in the Rhineland, the principal task which the Army has assigned to the Strategic Air Forces is the elimination or serious curtailment of Luftwaffe operations against our ground forces. During the past week when operations were possible the enemy’s fighters and fighter bombers raised havoc among our supply columns and troops. A large portion of Luftwaffe support aircraft recently moved up to airfields in the Frankfurt area. 1^st and 3^rd Divisions, between them, are attacking 10 of the most important of these bases. Each of these fields is now reported to be the base of at least one Gruppe of single engine aircraft. All six targets assigned to 3^rd Division are grass fields and are extremely vulnerable to posthole type bombing. It is estimated that successful bombing would render the fields unserviceable for two weeks. Since there are only a limited number of airfields available to the Germans in this area, many of their other fields are either under water or too rain-sodden to be operational. It is hoped to restrict the Germans choice of airdromes in this area so rigidly that they will be forced either to reduce the scale of their attacks on our ground forces or else will have to concentrate so many aircraft on their few remaining operational fields that they will be easy prey for our fighters.

Primary objective 2^nd Division:

• The general purpose of this mission is to dislocate and delay the enemy transportation system in this vital area. This shall be attained by:

•  (1) The maximum disruption to all traffic facilities, and rolling stock.
  (2) The demolition of rail-road. embankments and storage facilities,
  (3) The cratering of roads and the levelling of buildings in towns to block the roads,
  (4) Attacking towns in which reserve troops and supplies are located.

• 1^st and 3^rd div are attacking GU4068, 3963, 4393, 4329,4231, 4289, 4049, 3961, 4418, 4040. These are important as the GAF is using them for aircraft supporting their present attack. They have concentrated their force on these airfields but weather has prevented their operation to date. The tactical a/f has devoted itself to strafing and it will be the task of 1^st and 3^rd to post hole these bases thus denying their use to the GAF.

Intelligence on Anti-Aircraft in the 3^rd Division routing and target area:

• There are no known Flak defences on route from battle line to Rhine River. There is a good possibility of unplotted positions in this area due to the changing battle situation.

Intelligence for Anti-Aircraft in the target area:

• There is still believed to be a four-gun battery on course at Idstein in the Frankfurt-Limburg corridor. The Frankfurt defences should be avoided on this part of the route. All Groups have favourable Flak runs for their respective targets.

• There are no known defences at targets Zellhausen, Babenhausen and Gross Ostheim. However, meagre Flak has been reported from this area.

• There are about seventy guns of the Frankfurt defences that are within range of target Frankfurt main and there are one hundred guns just southwest of this target which will be avoided by a sharp left turn after bombing.

• There are seventeen guns at target Darmstadt-Griesheim.

• There are twelve to twenty guns at target Biblis and this Group should make a slight turn after bombing and be careful to avoid the Kaiserslautern defences on course back.

• All other Groups except those on Biblis should make good the corridors between Stuttgart and Pforzheim and between Strasbourg and Rastatt.

The intelligence on Anti-Aircraft artillery for the Second Force:

• There is no known Flak at primary or Secondary Targets.

• On route to target, four heavy guns at 5012N 0812E.

• On route back sixteen heavy guns at 5035N 0720E and it is important to hold course in this area with heavy guns known north and south of route.

Intelligence on Anti-Aircraft in the 2^nd Division routing and target area:

• Although some of these targets are not known to be defended it is probable that due to the immediate tactical importance to the enemy, defences may now be in place. Due to the complete fluidity of the area to be attacked and the battle area to the west of the targets, the length of time is Flak and the estimated number of guns on the run will not be given. All crews should be on the alert to take evasive action immediately after bombs away in the event such procedure becomes necessary. Due to tactical limitations the route on target SI-335294 and SI-442260 will run within range of defences at 5031N 0623E. Carpet aircraft in the formations on these targets will be requested to concentrate on these batteries.

The intelligence section of the 3^rd Division described the threat of the Luftwaffe for December 24^th:

Enemy Aircraft opposition:

• The GAF is now in a position on the western front which requires almost a maximum effort daily to protect the ground forces. Over 600 sorties were flown by the Luftwaffe on the 23^rd December in opposition to B-26’s of the Ninth Air Force and heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force. The Marauders bore the brunt of the attacks. Gunners should be briefed that as many as 650 day and night fighters might become airborne to oppose this mission and that interception might be expected as far west as 0600 degrees east. Weather as forecast should not offer enemy any tactical advantage, but will enable operations by GAF in great strength. If “company front” tactics are employed, tail and turret gunners should concentrate fire power on the aircraft attacking from nearest to 6 o’clock position. In this tactic, the usual maneuver is for the attacking enemy aircraft to dive below the level of the particular bomber or bombers singled out for attack and to nose up before firing. Although employed from the rear of the bombers, the tactics are similar to the “roller coaster”. Sometimes the enemy aircraft will pull out of the dive to attack from level. According to information at hand, the level approach is likely to be made when rearward firing guns appear to be “out of action”.

The intelligence section of the 2^nd Division wrote the following annex:

• 1.Forecast indicates there will be no weather restriction to take-off or assembly by enemy aircraft during this mission.

• 2.Probably 75 percent of total GAF single engined aircraft force is now based in tactical area on western front.

• 3.Total enemy aircraft observed by all forces operating in area today appears to approximate 600. Of this number less than 100 were at sufficient altitude for interception of heavy bombers. Great majority were at levels less than 15,000 feet as defence against Ninth Air Force medium bombers and as ground support. Encounters for the most part occurred in the Cologne – Bonn, Liège, and Trier areas.

• 4.Continued high-level attacks in the tactical area cannot fail to bring increasingly stronger enemy aircraft reaction and gunners should be briefed accordingly.

• 5. Attention is also drawn to report from Ninth Air Force of greatly increased aggressiveness of attack by individual GAF Pilots.

The intelligence section of the 1^st Division warned for the enemy reaction:

• Strong enemy aircraft opposition is very probable. 3^rd Division was attacked on today’s mission by approximately twenty Fw 190’s and Me 109’s in the Kaiserslautern area, and others were intercepted by fighter escort.

Luftwaffe units involved on 24^th December 1944.