34th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Command Pilot’s narrative, 93A – mission of 24 December 1944.
Target: Frankfurt, Germany.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 34th bombardment group (H).

1                    General narrative:
a. took off at 0940; made a normal individual climb and assembly
over Buncher 19 at 10,000 feet and proceeded to Buncher 28. Group assembly
was as briefed.

b. Wing assembly was as briefed. The time varied not more than
30 seconds at each point. Division assembly was good and as briefed except
that the group ahead of us was two thousand feet too high on assembly and
during climb to altitude.

c. Weather over England was excellent with cloud coverage nil and
visibility very good.

d. The winds changed so all groups were 20 to 25 minutes late at
I.P.. Groups ahead were 12 miles left of course going around box near I.P. and
we had to “S” to stay behind. Fighter support was not too good and they were
forced to leave at I.P. due to gas shortage.

e. Arrived at I.P. at 1500, and made a right turn onto target. Bombing
was visual by squadron formation. Ground haze was very bad on target run.
The target was sighted at last point of run, so large corrections had to be
made putting lead and high squadrons abreast at target. High squadron dropped
30 seconds before lead.

f. The primary target, Frankfurt, was attacked at 1506 from an altitude
of 25,000 ft. on a true heading of 275°. Results were good. There was
no undercast and flak in target area was very meager.

g. Made a left turn from target and maneuver to R.P. and back was as
briefed. There were no unusual occurrences enroute back.

h. Fighter support was fair and there were not enough groups. They
were forced to leave before I.P. due to shortage of gas. There was no enemy
fighter opposition.

i. recommend that take-off time be early enough to enable aircraft
to return to base before dark.

94^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer, mission of 24 December 1944,
Babenhausen, Germany (94^th “A” squadron)

TO:                 Commanding officer, headquarters, ninety-fourth bombardment
group (H) AAF, station 468

I. General Narrative:

1. The 94^th “A” squadron, flying lead squadron in the fourth “B” group,
took off at 0851-0923 hours. After individual climb our formation assembled
while flying at 5,500 feet. Twelve (12) aircraft, two of which were PFF aircraft,
comprised our formation at squadron and groups assembly.

2. Combat group assembly was completed while flying on briefed course from
buncher #22 to buncher #12 from 1013 to 1042 hours at 5,500 feet. All aircraft
of our squadron were present.

3. Air division assembly was completed while flying on briefed course from
buncher #12 to Felixstowe from 1042 to 1100 hours, from 5,500 feet to 9,400 feet.
All aircraft of our squadron were present. Twenty one groups comprised the third
air division forces, and our fourth “B” group was flying in second position.

4. The English coast was departed at Felixstowe at 1100 hours while flying
at 9,400 feet. All aircraft of our squadron were present. Weather over England
was as briefed. Undercast was nil although there was scattered ground haze.
Visibility was good at our altitude.

5. Landfall on the Belgium coast was made at Ostende at 1138 ½ hours while
flying at 15,800 feet. Weather from Belgium coast to the I.P. was as briefed.
There was nil undercast. Briefed route was flown.

6. The I.P. was reached at 1406 hours and a right turn made in squadron
formation. Uncovery was made in lead, high low order. Visual bombing was employed.

7. The primary target was attacked and bombs were away at 1416 ½ hours while
flying on a magnetic heading of 211 degrees at 22,200 feet. A left turn was made
off the target. No evasive action was taken as there was no flak in the target area.
Bombing results were believed to be good.

8. Briefed route back was flown, except for “S” ing in vicinity of the rally
point so as to give defensive power to the fourth “A” group which became a two
squadron formation as a result of enemy fighter attacks prior to reaching the I.P.
The Belgium coast was recrossed at the same point of entry at 1613 hours while flying
at 5,000 feet. The English coast was recrossed at Felixstowe at 1637 hours while
flying at 4,500 feet. Base was reached at 1648 hours and landings completed from
1648 to 1714 hours.

9. Friendly fighter support was present during most of the mission but were
absent for a 30 minute period from 1220 to 1250 hours. No enemy fighters attacked
our squadron or group, however, tail, level and low mass attacks were made on the
fourth “A” group which preceded us.

10. Recommendation:
If possible, plan approach to target so that runs are not made into the
sun, particularly when weather forecast predicts haze and fog in the target area.

II.                  Aircraft not attacking                                               94^th “A”         PFF (44-8134)
(43-38626)
Aircraft taking off                              10                   2
Aircraft attacking target                 10                   2
Aircraft credited with sorties       10                   2

III.                Aircraft Lost:

None.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer, mission of 24 December 1944,
Babenhausen, Germany (94^th  “B” squadron)

TO:                 Commanding officer, headquarters, ninety-fourth bombardment
group (H) AAF, station 468

I. General narrative:

1. The 94^th “B” squadron, flying high squadron is the fourth “B” group,
took off at 0847-0928 hours. After individual climb our formation assembled
while flying at 6,000 feet. Thirteen (13) aircraft, two of which were PFF,
comprised our formation at squadron and group assembly.

2. Combat group assembly, air division assembly, departure of English coast,
landfall on enemy coast and arrival at I.P. were all exactly as described by our
group leader (94^th “A” squadron). Our squadron leader was forced to return to
base while flying at 50°25’N-05°30E and the leader of the low section assumed
the squadron lead at this point.

3. The primary target was attacked and bombs were away at 1416 hours while
flying on a magnetic heading of 210 degrees at 22,300 feet. A left turn was made
off the target and no evasive action taken enroute to the R.P. .Bombing results
were believed to be fair. Our squadron encountered no flak in the target area.

4. Route back, friendly fighter support and enemy opposition were all
exactly as described by our group leader (94^th “A” squadron). Base was reached at
1648 hours and landing completed from 1652 to 1815 hours.

II.                  Aircraft not attacking:                      94^th “B”        PFF (44-8229)
(42-97963)
Aircraft taking off                              11                   2
Aircraft attacking target                 11                   1
Aircraft not attacking target         0                     1
Aircraft credited with sorties       11                   2

Reason for not attacking:
A/C #44-8229                    Pilot Long. This aircraft returned to base from 5025N-0530E
because oil pressure gauge indicated gradual reducing pressure
and subsequently indicated zero pressure, on #4 engine. This
aircraft was attacked by enemy fighters after leaving the formation
while flying on course out. Broken instrument oil line was replaced.
Sortie.

Note:             One aircraft listed above as attacking, attacked a target of opportunity,
with excellent results.

III. Aircraft Lost:

None.

SUBJECT:     report of operations officer, mission of 24 December 1944,
Babenhausen, Germany (94^th “C” squadron)

TO:                 commanding officer, headquarters, ninety-fourth bombardment
group (H) AAF, station 468

I. General narrative:

1. The 94^th “C” squadron, flying low squadron in the fourth “B” group,
took off at 0848-0930 hours. After individual climb our formation assembled
while flying at 5,000 feet. Thirteen (13) aircraft comprised our formation
at squadron and group assembly. One of these aircraft was a PFF aircraft.

2. Combat group assembly, air division assembly, departure of English
coast and landfall on Belgium coast were all exactly as described by our group
leader (94^th “A” squadron).

3. The I.P. was reached at 1408 hours and a right turn was made in squadron
formation. Uncovery was made in lead, high low order. Visual bombing technique
was employed.

4. The primary target was attacked and bombs were away at 1417 ½ hours while
flying on a magnetic heading of 219 degrees at 21,000 feet. A left turn was made
off the target and no evasive action taken enroute to the R.P. Bombing results
were observed to be good.

5. Route back, friendly fighter support and enemy opposition were all
exactly as described by our group leader (94^th “A” squadron). Base was reached
at 1649 hours and landings completed from 1650 to 1733 hours.

II.                  Aircraft not attacking                                               94^th “C”        PFF (44-8394)

Aircraft taking off                              12                   1
Aircraft attacking target                 12                   1
Aircraft credited with sortie         12                   1

III. Aircraft lost:

None.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer, mission of 24 December 1944,
Babenhausen, Germany (94^th “D” squadron)

TO:                 Commanding officer, headquarters, ninety-fourth bombardment
group (H) AAF, station 468

General narrative:

1. The 94^th “D” squadron, flying lead squadron in the fourth “C” group,
took off at 0845-0919 hours. After individual climb our formation assembled
while flying at 7,000 feet. Twelve (12) aircraft, two of which were PFF,
comprised our formation at squadron and group assembly.

2. Combat group assembly was completed while flying on briefed course
from buncher #22 to Buncher #12 from 1021 to 1045 hours at 7,000 feet. Our
high squadron was late in joining the group assembly, however, they effected
assembly with the group while flying the wing assembly route. All aircraft of
our squadron were present.

3. Air division assembly was completed while flying on briefed course
from buncher #12 to Felixstowe from 1045 to 1104 hours from 7,000 to 8,000 feet.
All aircraft of our squadron were present. Twenty one groups comprised the third
air division forces and our fourth “C” group was flying in third position.

4. The English coast was departed at Felixstowe at 1104 hours while flying
at 8,000 feet. All aircraft of our squadron were present. Weather over England
was as briefed. There was nil undercast although patchy ground haze was encountered.
Visibility was unlimited at our altitude.

5. Landfall on the Belgium coast was made at Ostende at 1145 hours while
flying at 15,000 feet. Weather from the Belgium coast to the I.P. was as briefed.
There was nil undercast. Briefed route was flown.

6. The I.P. was reached at 1410 hours and a right turn made in squadron
formation. Uncovery was made in lead, high low order. Visual bombing technique
was employed. The fourth “D” group cut the I.P. short and caused a near collision
with our high squadron.

7. The primary target was attacked and bombs were away at 1420 ½ hours
while flying on a magnetic heading of 207 degrees at 22,000 feet. A left turn
was made off the target and no evasive action was taken enroute to the R.P.
The high squadron of our group did not bomb the primary and continued on to the
secondary. Our lead squadron “S” ed in the target area so as to allow the high
squadron to effect group assembly and continue on course out.

8. Briefed route back was flown and the Belgium coast was recrossed at
our same point of entry at 1614 hours while flying at 5,000 feet. The English
coast was recrossed at Felixstowe at 1639 hours while flying at 3,500 feet. Base
was reached at 1632 hours and landings completed from 1649 to 1708 hours.

9. Friendly fighter support was present as briefed. They gave good
support. No enemy fighters made attacks on our group although enemy aircraft
were observed just prior to reaching the I.P. and in the target area.

II.                  Aircraft not attacking:                      94^th “D”        PFF (44-8239)
(44-8042)
Aircraft taking off                              10                   2
Aircraft attacking target                 8                     2*
Aircraft not attacking target         2                     0
Aircraft credited with sorties       9                     2

Reasons for not attacking:

A/C #43-38099                  Pilot Voss. This aircraft was hit by flak while flying at
50°13’N - 06°15’E. Immediately thereafter, #1 and #2 engines
began to operate poorly. Oil pressure on #1 engine went to
zero immediately, #2 engine fuel pressure went all the way up.
Ground check revealed #1 engine and fuel lines damaged.
#2 engine ground checked Ok and flight check was impossible due
to poor flying weather. Sortie.

A/C #42-37960                  Pilot Vaughn. This aircraft developed oil leak while flying on
course about half way across the channel. Subsequently all oil
in #1 engine was lost and engine was feathered and aircraft
returned to base. Ground check revealed auxiliary oil line fitting
which connects the oil line to the nose section of the engine and
the prop governor pressure switch had been hit by an empty
cartridge case. Damaged parts replaced. No sortie.

NOTE: One aircraft listed above as attacking, attacked a target of opportunity.

III. Aircraft lost:

None.

95^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operations officers narrative, mission 24 December 1944
Biblis, Germany.

TO:                 Commanding officer. 95^th Bomb group (H), APO 559.

1. General narrative: three squadrons of B-17’s took-off
to form 13 “D” combat group and attack Biblis, Germany. 95 “A”
squadron took-off at 0852-0901 hours and assembled over the base
at 10,000 feet by 1010 hours. 95 “B” squadron took-off at 0845-0902
hours and assembled at 11,000 feet by 1010 hours. 95 “C”
squadron took-off at 0904-0911 and assembled at 9,000 feet by 1010
hours.

After assembly, the squadrons effected group formation and
proceeded to buncher #11, where wing assembly was completed at 1051
hours, with the lead squadron at an altitude of 10,000 feet.
Division assembly was made over buncher #12 at 1102 hours, and 13
“D” group departed the English coast at 1117 hours over Felixstowe
at 10,000 feet. Here a climb to bombing altitude was begun. The
group crossed the enemy coast at 1154 hours at an altitude of 12,500
feet and from there to the I.P., followed the briefed course.

I.P. was crossed at 1424 hours, the lead squadron at 25,000
feet. Bombing interval was taken between squadrons and all three
squadrons bombed the primary target, although visibility in the
area was very poor. Bombs for the lead squadron were away at
1438 hours from an altitude of 25,000 feet. Group rally was
effected at 1441 hours and route out followed as briefed except
for being slightly north of course. Let down to minimum altitude
was begun at 1502 hours and the enemy coast recrossed at 1616 hours
at 8,000 feet of altitude. Reached English coast at 1641 and base
at 1648. Land for group was made at 1650-1728 hours.

2. Aircraft not attacking: 95 “A’ squadron – eleven A/C
plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary
target and are credited with sorties. 95 “B” squadron – eleven
A/C plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary
target and are credited with sorties. 95 “C” squadron – twelve
A/C plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary
and are credited with sorties.

3. Lost aircraft: none

13^th “E” Group

1. General narrative: 95 “E” group was composed of the
95^th D and 95^th E squadrons flying lead and high positions respectively
and a squadron from the 100^th group flying low position.

95 “D” squadron took off at 0922-0931 hours and assembled
over the base at 6,000 feet by 0950.

95 “E” squadron took off at 0910-0918 hours and assembled
over the base at 7,000 feet by 1014 hours.

The two squadrons effect group formation after assembling
and were joined over the base by the 100^th squadron; from
here the “E” group proceeded to buncher #11, making wing assembly at
0925 hours, altitude 10,000 feet. The formation departed the
English coast at 1119 hours and began climb to altitude.

Briefed course was followed to I.P. which was crossed
as briefed but due to poor visibility, the “E” group was unable
to bomb primary target. Instead, the group continued in division
formation and on the route out, 95 “D” squadron dropped on the secondary
target at 1437 hours from an altitude of 25,000 feet. 95 “E”
squadron bombed target of opportunity at 1505 hours. Route out
was followed, crossing the enemy coast at 1620 hours and the
English coast at 1644. Base was reached at 1651 and landing
effected at 1707-1732 hours.

2. Aircraft not attacking: 95 “D” squadron – eleven A/C
plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked secondary
target and are credited with sorties.

95 “E” squadron – eleven A/C plus one PFF left base in
formation. All A/C attacked T/O and receive sorties.

3. Aircraft lost: Aircraft #43-38760 left formation after
bombs away and slowly straggled from sight. No chutes were seen.

96^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Narrative of operations for the mission of 24 December 1944.
Darmstadt, Germany, 96^th A squadron

TO:                 Commanding officer, 96^th bombardment group (H), AAF.

1. General narrative: The 96^th A squadron took off on time in very good
weather. Squadron, group, combat wing and division assembly was effected with-
out any difficulty. The 96^th A squadron formation was fair, element leaders
and their wing men were too far out of position despite orders to close in for
a tight formation. The group formation was very good throughout the mission.
Route out was as briefed however the C.W. leader was ten miles off course through-
out mission which made it necessary to pull out from the bomb div. several
times to avoid unnecessary flak. The target was visual and bombed by squadrons.
The bomb run was made as briefed directly into the sun, making it extremely
difficult to spot the target. Route back was followed as briefed. Change of wind
other than briefed caused all groups to lose ½ hour in times. Landing was
effected safely by all ships. Several landing at Brussels. Flak was as briefed,
moderate, accurate at the front lines, also moderate accurate flak N.W. of
Frankfurt which inflicted considerable minor battle damage to group formation.
fighter support was excellent. No enemy fighters were observed. Weather was
as briefed, perfect for bombing, … out into the sun

2. Aircraft not attacking: 12 A/C left base in the formation as shown in
diagram A. All 12 A/C are credited with sorties. PFF A/C 44-8442, A/C 42-
32112, and A/C 44-8423 turned back before reaching the target.
All 9 A/C which went over the target bombed and the formation over the
target is shown in attached diagram B.

3. Lost aircraft: None.

96^th B Squadron : Page 609 / B5495 is unreadable.

SUBJECT:     Narrative of operations for the mission of 24 December
1944. Darmstadt, Germany. 96^th C Squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 96^th bombardment group (H), AAF.

1. General narrative: Take off and assembly of all units was
exceptionally good considering the size of the force. Formation
was good, with the exception of a few crews flying on wing which flew
a little too wide. Route out was good with the exception of being
about 30 miles late at the I.P., because of stronger winds than briefed.
Target was visual but bombing was poor due to the bombardier failure
to see the target. Bombing was done in squadron formation. Route
back was good with considerable time being made up: landing was a
bit difficult due to darkness and the great number of aircraft in the
air. Moderate, accurate flak was encountered crossing the battle
line and in several areas north of Frankfurt. No flak was encount-
ered over the target. Fighter support was good, but spread a little
thin. Enemy fighters were seen and attacked preceding groups prior
to the I.P. Weather was excellent in all respects.

2. Aircraft not attacking: 12 A/C left base in the formation
shown in the attached diagram E. All 12 A/C are credited with sorties.
A/C 43-37775 returned before reaching the target. All 11 A/C which
went over the target bombed and the formation is shown in attached
diagram F.

3. Lost aircraft: None.

SUBJECT:     Narrative of operations for the mission of 24 December 1944.
Darmstadt, Germany, 96^th D squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 96^th bombardment group (H), AAF.

1. General narrative: Take off and assembly were made as briefed
over buncher #9. Group formation was over buncher #10. Squadron and group
formation was excellent. Bombing was done by squadrons but due to the run
being made into the sun and the haze conditions, results were poor. Flak
was light and inaccurate. Three Me109s were sighted. Friendly fighter
support was fair.

2. Aircraft not attacking: 12 A/C left base in the formation as shown
in attached diagram “F”. A/C 42-107208 returned to base before reaching the
English coast out; the remaining 11 A/C are credited with sorties.
All 11 A/C which went over the target bombed and the formation over
the target is shown in attached diagram “G”

3. Lost aircraft: None.

SUBJECT:     Narrative of operations for the mission of 24 December
1944. Darmstadt, Germany. 96^th E Squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 96^th bombardment group (H), AAF.

1. General narrative: the 96^th E took off on time to make a
visual ascent and formed satisfactory at 16,000 ft. the 96^th XE
squadron and a 452^nd Gp. Sqdn. Formed the lead and high sqdns. of
the 45F Gp. To complete formation 20 mins before departure of base.
Base was departed 1 min early, and C.P. 2 5 mins late due to consid-
able “S” ing on route to enemy territory arriving late. Fighter
support was picked up at CP #3 which was arrived at 4 mins late.
Group fanned out in satisfactory manner and I.P. was made good and a
visual run with haze made. Bombs away on primary at 1458 with fair
results. Route back was briefed to near Brussels where leader
aborted for lack of gas. Formation was good other than the Hi Sqdn
of 452^nd Gp., Vampire Brown, who had difficulty keeping Sqdn together
and maintaining group formation; also breaking away from formation
without authorization after passing Strasburg on return. No
enemy fighters attacked 45F group, although reported near. Friendly
fighters observed in numbers. Flak was encountered meager accurate
by the two groups preceding near 5030N 0530E, 5022N 0600E, at
Giesen and 4850N 0840E.  Weather clear all over route.

2. Aircraft not attackin: 12 A/C left base in the formation
shown in the attached diagram “I”. all 12 A/C are credited with
sorties. A/C 43-37789 returned back to base before reaching the
target. All 11 A/C which went over the target bombed and the form-
ation is shown in attached diagram “J”.
4 A/C left base in the formation shown in diagram K. These
ships flew with the 388^th. All 4 A/C are credited with sorties.
all 4 A/C which went over the target bombed and the formation over
the target is shown in attached diagram “L”.

3. Lost aircraft: None.

100^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s narrative for mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 100^th bombardment group, (H), Army Air Force.

1. General narrative: Fifty-three aircraft plus nine PFF aircraft departed
this base in formation at 0910-0953 hours. The 100^th bomb group furnished
five squadrons. The100th “A”, “B”, and “C” squadrons flying as the 13^th “C”
group. The 100^th “D” squadron flying as the low squadron in the 13^th “B” group
and the 100^th “E” flying as the low squadron in the 13^th “E” group.

A. Squadron assembly: Good. According plan.

B. Group assembly: Excellent. When squadrons were assembled the
group was assembled.

C. Formation: Group and squadron formation was excellent throughout
assemblies.

D. Division assembly: Wing and division assembly good and on time.

E. Climb to bombing altitude: As briefed.

F. Route in: according to plan. Wind not as briefed causing the
whole division to be late at control points.

G. Target: Primary, Biblis A/F, bombed with good results.

H. Rally point: over ran to allow low squadron to catch up.

I. Descent: Normal.

J. Fighter support:

2. Aircraft not attacking: Fifty-three aircraft plus nine PFF aircraft
departed this base in formation as shown on the attached chart marked
“AFTER ASSEMBLY”.

“A”                  “B”                 “C”                 “D”                 “E”
A/C scheduled to take off                   10 & 3            10 & 2            11 & 2            11 & 1            11 & 1 PFF
A/C Dispatched                                        10 & 3            10 & 2            11 & 2            11 & 1            11 & 1 PFF
A/C Attacking                                           10 & 3            10 & 2            9 & 2              11 & 1            11 & 1 PFF
A/C not attacking                                  0                     0                     2                     0                     0

100^th “C” squadron:       Aircraft #43-38681 returned early due to #3 supercharger
inoperative. Leaving formation at 1140 hours position 51 22N 02 35E,
latitude 12,000 feet. Bomb returned.
Aircraft #43-37972 flew over target, but due to rack
trouble returned bombs.

3. Summary of losses: None.

385^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations, 385^th “A” squadron, mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 385^th bombardment group (H), APO 559.

1. Squadron assembly: lead ship took off late due to a ship change and
consequently formed late.

2. Group assembly: assembly with the other squadrons was late due to above
mentioned difficulties.

3. Formation was good except the route out where the squadrons had several
stragglers.

4. Division assembly: task force assembly was not as briefed due to the fact
that we left our buncher late. However, the force was intercepted and the proper
position flown. We were leading the 4 “D” group. The task force was intercepted
between Cambridge and Bury.

5. Climb to bombing altitude was as briefed.

6. Route in was as briefed up to the leg where we turned to the I.P. at that
time the 4 “F” group cut short the route, cutting off both myself and the 4 “E” group.
Giving us considerable propwash and causing us to deviate from the briefed course.
The 4 “F” group also cut off one squadron of the 4 “C” group which had split up for
squadron bombing.

7. Target: we were the second group over our assigned target due to the fact
that the 4”F” group cut us out before the I.P. we were approximately two minutes behind
the 4”F” group.

8. Rally: of squadrons was effected but the high squadron was forced away from
his position by another group and lost our group in the sun.

9. Descent was according plan.

10. Fighter support was excellent.

11. Remarks: group leaders should be briefed to hold their position in the
column.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations, 385^th “B” squadron, mission of
24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 385^th Bombardment squadron (H), APO 559.

1. Squadron assembly was fair. Not enough time was allotted for
the assembly or lateness was due to ships not being able to locate the
leader.

2. Group assembly was good and according to plan without
difficulty.

3. The formation was good. It was very loose except when “bandits”
were reported. Squadron formation was very good and that of the group fair.

4. The task force assembly was considered good. I was leading
the high squadron of the 4D group. A few minutes after leaving the
buncher we cut points X and Y and assembled at Z

5. The climb to bombing altitude was good and effected according
plan.

6. The briefed route in was followed, with times being approximately
17 minutes behind schedule. Visibility was good.

7. We were the first group overt the target. Lead-high-low was the
order of squadrons over the target at an interval of 200 yards.

8. The rally after bombing was excellent; however, I was forced
out by another group. The sun was very bright resulting in my losing
sight of the lead squadron. Bandits were in the vicinity so I tacked on
to the first group I saw.

9. The descent to minimum altitude was effected according to plan.

10. Fighter support was excellent and as briefed. They were met
just prior to entering enemy coast.

11. The mission did not seem to be well planned. Not once was the
sun in our favour. Groups should be briefed never to pass another group
over enemy territory.

12. Aircraft 43-38233 flying #4 position in the low section of the
385^th E squadron failed to return from this operation. Prior to reaching
the target area, while over enemy territory, aircraft 43-38233 went out
of control after apparently being hit by anti-aircraft fire. It left
its proper position, zooming down and then up into the aircraft that was
leading the section. The props of the lead aircraft struck 43-38233 and
cut it in two at the waist section/ the ship then disintegrated with no
chutes being observed leaving the wreckage. Nine crew members were aboard
this aircraft.

“A” Sq            “B” Sq           “C” Sq           “D” Sq           “E” Sq            Total
Aircraft scheduled to take off         12                   13                   13                   10                   9                      57
Aircraft taking off                              12                   13                   13                   10                   9                      57
Aircraft attacking                               12                   13                   13                   10                   8                      56
Aircraft not attacking                                               0                     0                     0                     0                      1                     1
Sorties credited                                    12                   13                   13                   10                   9                      57

Reasons why aircraft did not attack

E Sqn – 43-38233              collided with another aircraft prior to reaching
target area due to receiving damage by anti-aircraft
fire. Aircraft disintegrated in air without dropping
bombs. Sortie credited.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations, 385^th “C” Sqn, mission of 24 Dec. 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 385^th bombardment group (H), APO 559

1. The squadron and group assemblies were made as planned over
buncher 13. No difficulties were encountered.

2. The squadron and group formations were both good.

3. The task force assembly was made as briefed. We were the
fourth group in the task force. I led the low squadron of this group.

4. The climb to bombing altitude was made as briefed. There
were no deviations from prescribed course.

5. On the route in, the “F” group overran the D and E groups, and
caused them to “S” around off course. The confusion took place right
near our I.P., and made it extremely difficult to make our I.P. good.

6. The order of groups over our assigned target were as briefed.
The interval between my squadron and the preceding one was about 45 sec.

7. The low squadron made the rally with the lead squadron at the
rally point.

8. The descent was made according to plan.

9. The fighter support was good. It seemed very light in target
area, but I believe they were drawn off by enemy action.

10. Channel “A” communications were very poor.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations, 385^th “D” squadron, mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 385^th bombardment group (H), APO 559.

A. Squadron assembly was as briefed, as was group assembly.

B. The group was then joined on to the 4D group and we maintained our position
behind 4D until after we reached the target.

C. The formation was not good. The 2^nd flight lead section of the lead squadron
was formed from a composite group and did not fly very close. Also the high squadron
lagged somewhat.

D. The wing assembly route was not followed due to lead of 4D group being
late on take-off thus late on departing the buncher. The wing assembly route was cut
short and our two groups made the proper position in the wing column about half way
along the wing assembly route.

E. The climb to altitude was very slow, both as to rate of climb and airspeed.
However, the briefed route was followed closely.

F. The route to the target was followed as briefed. However, the 4F group
caused us much trouble. They (4F) passed us enroute, then “S” ed across in front of
our groups, then prior to the I.P. cut us out of the division column.

G. This group bombed ahead of 4C group. Otherwise our order of groups over the
target was as briefed.

H. Our group was able to execute a very successful rally between the squadrons
after the target. However, we were not able to catch the 4D group.

I. the descent and route out was as briefed.

J. fighter support was as briefed. However, there were a few enemy fighters
able to get at us.

K. The problems encountered could be eliminated if every group leader maintained
his correct position in the division.

SUBJECT:     Report of operations, 385^th “E” squadron, mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 commanding officer, 385^th bombardment group (H), APO 559.

1. Squadron assembly was effected according to briefed plan.

2. Group assembly with lead squadron was made without any
difficulties.

3. Formation: squadron formation was good with exception when encountering
prop wash from other groups. Group formation dragged slightly in climb with high
squadron to the rear.

4. Task force: I was leading the low squadron in the 4 “E” group. We left the
buncher about two minutes late following 4”D”. We intercepted the task force on time
but 4F and 4G seemed to be too close behind 4C. This caused a bunching effect of the
groups over the continent.

5. The climb to altitude was as briefed.

6. Route in: visibility was very good with slight haze toward the ground.
Our course was slightly to the left of briefed course to avoid flak area. Here we
encountered flak that was uncharted.

7. The order of groups on target was 4A, 4B, 4C, 4F, 4D and 4E, etc. As far
as I know 4F out in front of 4D and 4E. We hot target according to briefed interval.
We were in the 4”E” group.

8. Rally: a slight turn from target was effected with briefed descent to R.P.
we picked up the lead squadron slightly beyond the R.P. as the high squadron was behind
when turning on the I.P.

9. Descent was according to plan.

10. Fighter support: very good. The 4A group encountered bandits of which
pulled some of the fighters from us, but we still had a sufficient amount.

11. Remarks: groups should retain their interval from the time they intercept
the task force until turn off rally point at least. Cutting groups out on turns
invokes a dangerous problem.

388^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer on mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 388^th bombardment group (H), APO 559.

388^th “A” squadron formation:

1. General narrative. The lead aircraft of the 388^th “A”, 388^th “B”,
and 388^th “C” took off 0840-0844 hours and assembled into group
formation over buncher #10 at 10,000 feet using the instrument assembly procedure.
The 388^th “A” squadron took off 0913-0931 hours and assembled over
buncher #10 at 10,000 feet using the instrument assembly procedure. The 45^th
“A” group departed buncher #10 on time and on course for Thetford. The wing
and air division assembly was as briefed. The 45^th “A” group started the
climb to bombing altitude upon departing the English coast at Felixstowe. The
route from the English coast to a point just over the battle line was flown
as ordered, at which time moderate and very accurate flak was encountered
between Frankfurt and cologne. The leader of the 45^th “A” group had to abort
due to battle damage and the deputy leader took over and reformed the group
about five miles north of course. The 45^th “A” group continued on course to
the right of the 13^th wing which was about 15 miles north of course. At the
Pre I.P. the 13^th wing converged on course and it was necessary for the 45^th
“A” group to “S” left to get in proper division column. At the I.P. the 45^th
“A” group made a normal fan-out procedure and made a visual bomb run on the
primary target, bombing by squadrons with fair results. The 388^th “A” squadron
turned to the R.P., lost 1,000 feet, and rally was effected as planned. Return
route was flown as ordered. The 45^th “A” group started the descent to minimum
altitude overt the battle line. At that time the wing was in loose column.
Letdown was continued to control point #4 which was reached about 38 minutes
late due to a wind shift. The 45^th “A” group returned to home base and landed
1705-1729 hours without incident. Moderate and inaccurate flak was encountered
up to the I.P.; however there was none on the bomb run. Flak was nil on the
return route. Enemy fighters, jet-propelled and Me-109’s, were observed but
no attacks were registered against this group. VHF contact was excellent until
after the target and the it was fair. Weather was as briefed and contact with
the weather ship was excellent. Friendly fighter support was fair.

2. Aircraft not attacking. Eleven A/C, plus 2 PFF A/C, took off as
scheduled. One A/C returned early, a mechanical failure. The remaining ten
A/C, plus 2 PFF A/C, attacked and received sorties. Their positions in the
formation at time of assembly and over target, are shown in the attached
diagram.

3. Aircraft lost. None

388^th “B” squadron formation:

1. General narrative. The 388^th “B” squadron took off 0906-0923
and assembled over buncher #10 at 10,500 feet using the instrument assembly
procedure. Reference is made to the above report of the 388^th “A” squadron
formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission which was
flown, as high squadron in the 45^th “A” group, in company of the 388^th “A”
squadron.

2. Aircraft not attacking. Eleven A/C plus 2 PFF A/C, took off as
scheduled. One A/C was missing in action before the target, receiving a
sortie. The remaining ten A/C, plus 2 PFF A/C, attacked and received sorties.
Their positions in the formation, at time of assembly and over target, are
shown in the attached diagram.

3. Aircraft lost.              A/C 43-38424 left the formation after the target
with #1 engine feathered. It is believed that this A/C landed in France.

A/C 44-8411 was hit by flak before the target and
blew up. 6 chutes.

388^th “C” squadron formation:

1. General narrative. The 388^th “C” squadron took off 0924-1006
and assembled over buncher #10 at 9,500 feet using the instrument assembly
procedure. Reference is made to the above report of the 388^th “A” squadron
formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission which was
flown, as low squadron in the 45^th “A” group, in company of the 388^th “A”
squadron.

2. Aircraft not attacking. Thirteen A/C, plus one 1 PFF A/C, took off as
scheduled. One A/C returned early, a mechanical failure. The remaining twelve
A/C, plus 1 PFF A/C, attacked and received sorties. Their positions in the
formation, at time of assembly and over target, are shown in the attached
diagram.

3. Aircraft lost. None.

388^th “D” squadron formation:

1. General narrative. The lead aircraft of the 388^th “D” and 388^th “E”
squadrons took off 0840 and assembled over buncher #10 at 13,000 feet. The
388^th “D” squadron took off 0856-0905 hours and assembled over buncher #10
at 13,000 feet using the instrument assembly procedure. The 388^th “E”
squadron assembled into group formation, however the 96^th “D” squadron did
not make assembly with the 45^th “B” group. The 45^th “B” group was 3,000
feet higher than the 45^th “A” group however no difficulty was experienced
except that some “S” ing was necessary to maintain the proper interval behind
the 45^th “A” group. Approximately at Swaffam the 96^th “D” squadron made formation
with the 45^th “B” group and division assembly was approximately as
briefed. The 45^th “B” group maintained their altitude and did not start their
climb until the 45^th “A” group had climb to the same altitude as the 45^th “B”
group. The 45^th “B” group then started their climb to bombing altitude,
reaching bombing altitude approximately at the briefed point. The interval
of the 45^th “B” group behind the 45^th “A” was less than two minutes on the
route in and proper interval of two minutes was obtained just prior to the
I.P. The 45^th “A” group had to “S” behind the combat wing ahead of the 45^th,
thereby causing the 45^th “B” group to make a large “S” before turning on towards
the I.P. The 45^th group executed the fan-out procedure, peeled off by
squadrons, making individual bomb runs on the primary target. Rally was
effected as planned and the return route was uneventful with the descent to
minimum altitude accomplished as briefed. The 388^th “D” squadron arrived at
home base and landed 1727-1753. Flak was nil except at the battle line on
the route in which was moderate and accurate. Enemy fighters were in the
area however no attacks were made on the 388^th “D” squadron. Friendly fighter
escort was very good. Weather was approximately as briefed for the entire
route.

2. Aircraft not attacking. Eleven A/C, plus 2 PFF A/C, took off as
scheduled, attacked, and received sorties. Their positions in the formation
at time of assembly and over the target, are shown in the attached diagram.

3. Aircraft lost. None.

388^th “E” squadron formation:

1. General narrative, the 388^th “E” squadron took off 0854-0916
hours and assembled over buncher #10 at 13,500 feet using the instrument
assembly procedure. Reference is made to the above report of the 388^th “D”
squadron for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission which was
flown, as high squadron of the 45^th “B” group, in company of 388^th “D”
squadron.

2. Aircraft not attacking. Eleven A/C, plus 1 PFF A/C, took off as
scheduled, attacked, and received sorties. Their positions in the formation,
at time of assembly and over target, are shown in the attached diagram.

3. Aircraft lost. None

388^th “F” squadron formation:

1. General narrative. The 388^th group put up six A/C to form the
lead section of the 388^th “F” squadron, and the 96^th group furnished the low
section. The lead A/C was of the 388^th group and took off 0840 hours and
assembled over buncher #9 at 15,000 feet. The other five A/C were 1^st Division
A/C and took off at 0850 hours and assembled over buncher #9 at 15,000 feet.
The 388^th “F” squadron formed the low squadron of the 45^th “F” group. The
45^th “F” group was in proper win order on the wing assembly route and the
45^th “F” group had some trouble due to the difference in altitude, however the
leader considers the planning as excellent. The leader of the 45^th “F” group
started his climb to bombing altitude before the 45^th “A” group reached the
assembly altitude of the 45^th “F” group. This caused the 45^th “F” group to
do considerable “S” ing. The 45^th “F” group made a course of approximately
12 miles north of briefed course on the leg to the I.P. due to all other
groups taking too much interval in the fan-out. The primary target was
bombed visually. The 388^th “F” squadron got back in group formation at the
rally point and return route was approximately as briefed with the descent
to minimum altitude started at the right point on the battle line. Over
England three A/C broke formation and returned to their proper base and four
A/C including the lead A/C landed at 1737-1740 hours this base. Flak
was seen at the battle line on the route in, however no flak was experienced
by the 388^th “F” squadrons. Weather was as briefed. No enemy fighters were
seen and friendly fighter escort was good. The 1^st division crews did not fly
good formation possible due to the fact the crews were from several bases
in the 1^st division. The 96^th squadron leading the 45^th “F” group had some
spare A/C however they would not fill in the second flight of the second
section of the low squadron. Only three A/C of the 1^st Division scheduled to
fly as the second section of the 388^th “F” group formed or flew with the
388^th “F” squadron. Only four A/C toggled on the lead A/C of the 388^th “F”
squadron, the rest toggling late and some toggled one to three minutes late.

2. Aircraft not attacking. One PFF A/C took off as scheduled, attacked,
and received a sortie. Its position in the formation, at time of assembly and
over the target, is shown in the attached diagram.

3. Aircraft lost. None.

390^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operations narrative of mission #229, 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 390^th bombardment group (H).

390 “A” squadron
command pilot – Lt Col. Jones.

1. General narrative: The 390 “A” squadron flew as lead
squadron of the 13 “A” group, leading the 13^th wing. Take-off and
assembly were as briefed. Wing assembly was as briefed, but some
difficulty was encountered with division assembly in that the last
group of the 4^th wing was late in assembling, and a parallel course
was flown with this group most of the way in. approximately one (1)
hour before target time, a flak burst punctured the Plexiglas nose.
Malfunction of the bombsight was caused by the resulting air stream,
and the rate end mechanism was found to be frozen on the bomb run.
This resulted in a strike report of PA4. The withdrawl and return
to bases was as briefed. The flak was moderate and accurate. There
were no fighter attacks on this formation. Weather was as briefed
except for ground haze, which was heavy.

2. Aircraft not attacking: twelve (12) A/C took off as
scheduled, attacked, and are credited with sorties. Formation at
assembly and over the target is shown in diagram “A”

3. Aircraft lost: none

390 “B” squadron
Command pilot – Maj. Brown

1. General narrative: the 390 “B” squadron flew as high
squadron of the 13 “A” group. Take-off and assembly were as briefed.
The balance of the mission was flown essentially as briefed
with such exceptions as are shown above for 390 “A”. Timings were
late because of wind change. Bombardier had trouble on run because
of looking into sun.

2. Aircraft not attacking: Eleven (11) A/C took off, attacked,
and are credited with sorties, formation at assembly and over target is
shown in diagram “B”

3. Aircraft lost: None

390 “C” squadron
Command pilot – Capt. Wilkinson.

1. General narrative: the 390 “C” squadron flew as low
squadron of the 13 “A” group. Take-off and assembly were as briefed.
Flak was encountered crossing the enemy lines at St. Vith and
Malmedy, and damage sustained to number 2 and number 3 engines.
Two (2) hours later, at 1402, number 3 prop ran away, and could not
be feathered. It was impossible to maintain formation, so lead was
turned over to deputy. The low squadron, under the deputy lead
proceeded to the target and dropped on the lead squadron. The balance
of the mission was flown as briefed with such exceptions as are
noted for 390 “A”

2. Aircraft not attacking: twelve (12) A/C took off as
scheduled. A/C 206 (Stene) hot by flak and aborted before bomb run;
is credited with sortie. Thus eleven (11) A/C attacked and twelve
(12) A/C credited with sorties. Formation at assembly is shown in
diagram “C” and over the target in diagram “D”

3. Aircraft lost: none

390 “D” squadron
command pilot – Maj. Engelbrecht.

1. General narrative: the 390 “D” squadron flew as lead
squadron of the 13 “B” group. Take-off and assembly were as briefed.
Division formation and timings were generally good. However,
the last few groups of the division lead wing and 13^th wing bunched
up considerably, causing a broadening of the division column,
considerable “S” ing and little flexibility for manoeuvring. Fireball
Charlie being too far forward and only slightly higher gave the “B”
group an excessive amount of prop wash. The bunching up, coupled
with quite a bit of uncharted flak, presented difficulties. As a
result of these two factors and manoeuvring to avoid flak, two (2)
groups of the 4^th wing fell in between us and the 13 “A” group and
caused us to fly a course slightly north of briefed course. However,
our I.P. was made good and the bomb run was good. Bombardier changed
I.P. to left when he noted right side of target was well hit. R.P. was
made and group reassembled. 13 “B” fell into division column
and return was as briefed.

2. Aircraft not attacking: Twelve (12) A/C took off as
scheduled. A/C 984 (Drinkwalter) aborted before reaching enemy
territory and is not credited with a sortie. A/C 812 (Henry)
aborted in enemy territory, did not attack, and is credited with a
sortie. A/C 274 (Fackelman) and A/C 173 (Herring) were lost, to
flak, before the target; are credited with sorties, but did not
attack. Thus, eight (8) A/C attacked, and eleven (11) are credited
with sorties. Formation at assembly is shown in diagram “E” and
over the target in diagram “F”

3. Aircraft lost: A/C 274 (Fackelman) hit by flak at 5023N-
0852E. Outer panel of wing knocked off; plane split – “S” ed out of
formation, spun in, and exploded on the ground. No chutes were
observed.
A/C 173 (Herring) hit by flak at 5023N-0852E. Plane exploded
in mid-air. No chutes were reported seen.

390 “E” squadron
Command pilot – Capt. Perry.

1. General narrative: the 390 “E” squadron flew as high
squadron of the 13 “B” group. Take-off and assembly were as briefed.
On the bomb run, the Vickers unit of the top turret caught fire
and caused the cockpit to fill with smoke. The pilot had the elevator
turned off on the AFCE, because, it wasn’t functioning well.
When the cockpit became smoked up, he hit the wheel as he reached
for the window, and caused the bomb sight gyro to topple. This
caused an error in bomb release. The withdrawl was flown as briefed.

2. Aircraft not attacking: twelve (12) took off as scheduled.
A/C 127 (Kenny) landed on continent after crossing target, and is
credited with a sortie. Thus twelve (12) A/C attacked, and are
credited with sorties. Formation at assembly and over the target
is shown in diagram “G”.

3. Aircraft lost: None.

447^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     S-3 narrative for 447 A, mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding general, 3D bombardment division, APO 559.

1. 12 A/C of the 447^th bomb Gp., including 2 PFF A/C, took off
between the hours of 0849 and 0938 to form lead squadron of 4G group,
flying seventh in 3BD forces. Normal bad weather pattern was followed
in making assembly over the field at 7,000’. Weather was excellent, and
assembly was effected quickly. Crossing over our buncher on a NE heading
preparatory to making a 180° turn toward the first point of wing assembly,
we found ourselves paralleling the 4A group, which according to our
estimates should have been several miles south of us on a westerly heading.
Wing assembly was made on time with visual reference to the 4F group.
However, enroute to division assembly, two or three groups cut inside us
far south of course and ended up by forcing both 4F and 4G to the left of
the column at coast out despite the fact that we made coast out on time.
Contact with Kodak control and the 13CW leader behind us showed that we
were in correct position on 4F group, but that our two groups were flying
parallel with 4C and 4D, with 4E actually behind us. The resulting “S” ing
caused considerable interference and finally ended in our giving way to a couple
of 13CW groups. Flak encountered at 06°00’E caused a sharp turn by the
column and left us at an excessive interval from 4F group, though in close
contact with two units above us. I.P turn and visual run were normal, bombing
being visually by squadrons with fair, good and excellent results. Rally
was made with the 4E group directly on our left, our low squadron being a
little slow re-joining formation due to difficulty in identifying us. A call
from another group at our right kept us from continuing interference with
their run on the secondary and rout out was then followed essentially as
briefed, maintaining close formation with 4E.

High and low squadron leaders did an excellent job of keeping
position despite extended “S” ing and individual A/C did a good job of
formation flying as well as of landing in the dark with the confusion of
having about 30 visiting A/C landing at the same time.

2&3. 2 A/C failed to attack, both being knocked out of formation by
flak at 06°00’E. Both were dispatched and made a sortie. Lt. King (PFF 355)
went down on being hit, and his A/C fell apart, with a probability that no
men got out. Lt. Jep son aborted and landed at Woodbridge.

4. Formation diagrams are attached.

SUBJECT:     S-3 narrative, 447^th  “E” squadron, mission 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding general, 3D bombardment division, APO 559.

1. 11 A/C plus two PFF A/C took off between the hours of 0850 and
0942 to form the “B” (High squadron 4C Gp.). Assembly was effected quickly
at 7,500. Weather was good. Times by lead were good and because of
several late groups, some confusion was caused on the route in. prop wash
was caused by extensive “S” ing. Common point and I.P. was made without
incident and high squadron bombed with good results on primary (visually).
Route out was good.

2. The 4G high squadron had two abort; A/C 400 to engine failure
A/C 936 lost 3 turbos. Pilot of A/C 400 returned and used spare.
A/C 938 dropped one rack late and A/C 080 dropped late.

3a. No A/C lost
b. No enemy A/C were encountered.
c. Flak on route across lines was moderate to heavy and accurate.

4. Formation diagram attached.

SUBJECT:     S-3 narrative, 447^th C squadron, mission 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding general, 3D bombardment division, APO 559

1. 11 A/C plus 2 PFF A/C formed the low or “C” Sqn. Of the 447^th.
Assembly was made quickly without incident. The primary was bombed
visually by making a manual run. (AFCE was out) with fair results. The
No.2 man could not take over on bomb run because his bombardier was
wounded. The formation, the entire route, was superior.

2. A/C 567 aborted over channel.

3. No A/C were lost.

4. Formation diagrams attached.

SUBJECT:     S-3 narrative for mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 447^th Bomb group (H), APO 559.

1. The high squadron of the 4E composite group consisted of
12 aircraft plus 1 PFF aircraft from the 447^th Bomb Group. Group
assembly was without incident over buncher #13. Wing assembly was
difficult because of interference with another group and with a
single high squadron from another group which flew in our group
until just before coast out. Control point #2 was made late. Route
to the I.P was made in a staggered column, two and sometimes three
groups wide. The 4E group was in flak for a period of approximately
an hour but because of the nearness of a group flying on out left
wing the flak all burst between the two (2) groups. At the I.P. the
4E group was forced wide because of interference with another group
and with a straggling high squadron. Approximately three (3) minutes
before bombs away the bombsight on the lead A/C of the high
squadron failed to operate. Bombs were dropped by setting in a
pre-computed dropping angle and guessing as course. Route out was
flown largely slightly south of course and without incident.

2. All aircraft dropped their bombs.

3. No aircraft were lost.

4. Formation diagrams are attached.

452^nd BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operation’s officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “A” squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H)

1. The 45^th “C” group formed north of the 452^nd buncher and could have caused
trouble, the 452^nd was forced to stay away from the buncher. Assembly was as briefed.
Wing and division assemblies were as briefed. Group formation was excellent, squadron
was excellent after our fighter attack. Climb to bombing altitude was as briefed.
enemy coast was reached on time, a great deal of “S” ing was done after crossing coast,
last 35 minutes. Weather was as briefed. Route into I.P., I.P into target as briefed,
briefed heading was flown. Fen-out of squadrons five minutes before I.P. was accomplished
with no difficulty. The 452^nd group rally was made as briefed, descent was not
as briefed, due to shortage of gas, started descent later than briefed and at a slower
rate of descent.

2. Friendly fighters were not visible to this group, could not contact support
when it was needed.

3. This mission was planned with the run from I.P. to target in the sun. It
was impossible for bombardier to …. On the target in sight, because of the glare.

4. Of the 452^nd “A” squadron, 10 A/C plus 2 PFF A/C, scheduled and airborne.
2 A/C aborted prior to reaching English coast out. B&M, 1 A/C aborted over Belgium -
Personnel, 1 A/C aborted 5010N-0702E – enemy action, 1 A/C aborted 5011N – 0647E – personnel.
4 A/C plus 2 PFF, attacked and bombed primary target – visual. Credit given for
9 sorties.

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “B” squadron.

to:                  Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H).

1. Group assembly was effected as briefed, except B-24’s formed at same altitude.
Wing and division column was as briefed. Formation for both group and squadron
was good, usual tendency of rear ships to struggle. Climb to bombing altitude was as
briefed, except for considerable “S” ing on on part of groups ahead, causing us to do the same.
route from enemy coast in as briefed, except for “S” ing noted above. Also somewhat
north of course. Visibility was very good except for ground haze in target area. I.P.
into the target was as briefed, bombing done by squadrons – individually, ground
haze and run being made into the sun. Made target difficult to pick up with sight.
Briefed heading from I.P. to target was flown. Rally was quickly effected by the high
squadron, lost 1,000’ after target. Route out as briefed except rate of descent which
was approximately 160 .PM due to loss gasoline supply.

2. Friendly fighter support was very good, as briefed.

3. Target run should be planned to give the bombardier a break. Had run been
made on reciprocal course, results would have been greatly improved. Wing and division
assembly line might be made to follow English coast from some point south of the wash
to eliminate interference from other wings and divisions forming inland. Group could
fly due east to coast.

4. Of the 452^nd “B” squadron, 12 A/C plus 1 PFF A/C, scheduled and airborne.
12 A/C plus 1 PFF, attacked and bombed primary target – visual; 1 A/C – 2 bombs on target
of opportunity – R.P. credit given for 13 sorties.

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “C” squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H).

1. Assembly was as briefed, 96^th formation circled over our field, interfering
twice with our formation, however there was plenty of open space for us to the North-West
if our leader had chosen. Other groups assembled and left on time, on course, as briefed,
no difficulties. Our position was 16^th in the division column. Division
leader was 2 or 3 minutes late at CP #1 causing groups behind to push together, making
them “S” to hold interval. Group formation was fair, lead squadron formation was very
poor – too many aborts and too much radio conversation in regard to their aborting.
climb was made very easy. Climb was not begun at coast out point , but a few minutes
later. Green began climb then levelled off to wait for red to begin climb. From enemy
coast to target – flight plan was as briefed, except being late. Flak was more than
expected, flak was encountered at the battle line. Visibility was good, both downward
and at altitude. No deviations of flight plan except some “S” ing. Squadrons over the
target were A, B and C. Interval was approximately 1 minute. Briefed heading was
flown. No evasive action was necessary. Target was little difficult to pick up. No
unusual occurrences. Rally was effected very good. Low and high reached the lead about
the same time. Rally was made quicker than briefed. Route from target was as briefed
and let down the same. It was according to briefed plan.

2. Fighter support was as briefed. The fighters did not give as close support
as usual. Enemy fighters made attacks on the “B” squadron and other flew out of range
to our left.

3. Express on crew the necessity of good formation. When fighters were sighted
everyone flew tight so they can do it all the time. Stop the arguments over VHF, especially
on return to base.

4. Of the 452^nd “C” squadron, 12 A/C plus 1 PFF A/C, scheduled and airborne.
1 A/C aborted prior to I.P. , KNE(?), attacked and bombed target of opportunity – cologne M/Y.
11 A/C plus 1 PFF, attacked and bombed primary target. Credit given for 13 sorties.

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “D” squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H).

1. Assembly was good and as briefed, left on course, on time. 45 “A” group
assembled over buncher with 45 “D” group and was in proper position throughout entire
assembly. The taskforce as it left CP #1 seemed very good and the 45 “A” group was is
proper position and interval. Formation was fair, due to ?HE? , this squadron consisted
mostly of new crews and an number of war weary ship. Climb started at CP #1, was 2000’
below brief altitude at CP #3 because the group ahead levelled off for a time to give
his high squadron chance to catch up. Our group continued its position in wing formation.
considerable “S” ing of all groups from English coast into target, probably
started by division leader by evading flak areas. Time at target was 35 minutes late
due to wind change from briefed. The “A” squadron, 45 “E” group failed to drop on primary
target or secondary and continued on to target of opportunity. High and low squadrons
rallied after target, continuing on course. Lead squadron squadron joined bomber stream
following 45 “F” group back to continent. Order of groups was 45 “E” group. Bombed by squadrons
in order of A, B and C. Good and proper interval was held by both group and squadrons.
Fan-out was very good, heading from I.P. to target as briefed. Lead group failed to bomb primary
because of the bad visibility bombing into the sun.
failed to drop on secondary because the bombardier saw that bombs were not going to hit the
target area. Bombed target of last resort –visual. 45 “E” lead squadron did not rally
but held altitude and continued to target of last resort, high and low squadron descended
1,000’ off target as briefed and continued on briefed route out. Lead squadron, after bombing
target, fell into bomber stream, following 45 “F” group out. Route out flown as briefed.

2. Friendly fighter support was very good, none were observed in and around the
target area.

3. it is felt that faulting planning occurred in having bomb run into sun.

4. Of the 452^nd “D” squadron, 10 A/C plus 2 PFF A/C, scheduled and airborne.
1 A/C aborted – 5018N-0620E – enemy action. 1 PFF A/C MIA before target – direct hit,
5015N-0600E. 1 A/C attacked primary target – 9 bombs, 3 bombs – target of opportunity -
4935N-0845E. 2 A/C attacked and bombed target of last resort – Niskarsuln??. 6 A/C plus
1 PFF, attacked and bombed target of last resort – Hellbroun. Credit given for 12
sorties.

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “E” squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H).

1. Group assembly was effected without incident. The “E” group was three minutes
late at the wing assembly point, but time was made up by cutting short the route.
no difficulties were encountered. The assembly at CP#1 was as briefed except our
interval was about 1 minute too close. This was corrected by “S” ing and flying echelon
to the left at CP#2. Our position was the 5^th group in the wing as briefed. Group
formation was good. Squadron formation was loose until the preceding group was attacked
by fighters. The climb and course to bombing altitude was as briefed. The route
in was as briefed. The visibility was good except for some thin low stratus clouds.
the target was difficult to find due to the low haze and reflection of the sun. briefed
route was flown into target. The high squadron reached target first as the lead was off
course. The order of squadron from I.P. was Lead, high and low. The lead squadron
failed to attack the primary target, therefore attacked secondary. The rally was made
good only by the high and low squadrons because the lead squadron got behind at the target.
We lost 1,000’ after leaving the target, rallied with the low squadron. Started
let down after crossing the battle line, taking briefed route out. Let down was made
all the way, 160 MPH – 200 ft/min, in order to conserve fuel.

2. Friendly fighter support was good. They met us as briefed and left the
formation after the rally point.

3. This target could have been more successfully attacked if the route planning
had not been into the sun.

4. Of the 452^nd “E” squadron, 12 A/C plus 1 PFF A/C, scheduled and airborne.
1 A/C aborted 5032N-0620E - ???. 1 A/C over target, failed to attack - ???, 1 A/C
over target, failed to attack – personnel. 9 A/C plus 1 PFF, attacked and bombed
primary target – visual. Credit given for 13 sorties.

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission 24 December 1944, “F” squadron.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 452^nd bombardment group (H).

1. Assembly was effected quickly. Vampire Fox leader left the base about a
minute early putting us ahead of vampire Easy. Fox leader “S”ed into position behind
Vampire Easy. Group, wing and division assemblies were as briefed. Lead and low
squadrons were in good position, but we were straggling behind. Climb to bombing altitude
was as briefed. Crossed enemy coast on time. After crossing enemy coast the leader
“S”ed a great deal. Haze on the ground and the sun being at 12 o’clock to us made the
target difficult to pick up. Enemy coast into I.P., I.P. into target as briefed. The
briefed heading was flown. Fan-out was executed prior to the I.P. with no unusual
difficulty. The bombardier was unable to pick up the primary target, making it
necessary to bomb the secondary target. Rally was as briefed. A descent of 1,000’ was
made between the target and the rally point. Route out was as briefed. Descent was
at a slower rate due to the shortage of gas.

2. Friendly fighter support was good.

3. Axis of attack should have been planned so the sun wouldn’t be at 12 o’clock
on the bomb run.

4. Of the 452^nd “F” squadron – 1^st division A/C – 13 A/C plus 2 PFF A/C, scheduled
and airborne. Attacked and bombed secondary target. All A/C returned to home base.

486^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer – mission of 24 December 1944 – M/Y -
Gros Ostheim, Germany.

TO:                 Commanding Officer, 486^th Bombardment Group (H).

486^th “A” Squadron
(4^th “F” Group)

1. General narrative: The 486^th group scheduled thirteen (13) A/C (lead
and deputy lead PFF A/C included) to fly as the lead squadron of the 4^th “F”
group. Take-off was as scheduled from 0914 to 0934 hours followed by climb to
assembly altitude of 5,500’ , over buncher #22. The squadron was completely formed
at 1020 hours and the high and low squadrons were in position on “A” squadron
one (1) minute later. The first point on the wing assembly line (buncher #22) was
made on time at 1025 hours. From here, the group proceeded to make good the
remaining points in the wing assembly line. Buncher #22 was crossed at 1055 hours
two (2) minutes early and the English coast was crossed at 1107 hours, one (1)
minute early at altitude of 7,500’.

Assembly with the other groups in the wing was difficult because the
4^th “B” group was slow and the 4^th “F” group slightly fast. Considerable “S” ing
was necessary after departing CP 1 and the group did not correctly position
itself until well over the channel. The Belgium coast was crossed at 1150 hours,
ten (10) minutes late. Course was right of briefed and position in bomber stream
was assumed before reaching CP 3.

Climb to bombing altitude was begun after the English coast was departed
and continued until 22,000’ altitude was reached at CP 3. A near briefed course
was followed from here on to the I.P. at the I.P. , a right turn was made, and the
group peeled off into squadron formation to make a visual bomb run on the
primary target. Thick haze and sun glare prevented the target from being picked up
in time, and the squadrons (high and low trailing) proceeded to a selected I.P
for the secondary target. Ground haze and sun glare made identification difficult,
but bombs were dropped at 1450 hours. Rally was effected with little
difficulty (1,000’ altitude being lost between target and R.P.), and the group
proceeded on near briefed route out. Descent to minimum altitude was made as
planned and the Belgian coast crossed at 1616 hours. Normal landings were
effected from 1650 to 1750 hours.

Formation was generally god. However, interval between groups was too
small causing confusion when groups were trying to get into proper position in
the bomber stream. No enemy A/C were encountered, and flak was moderate and
generally inaccurate in the target area. Fighter support was good.

2. Aircraft not attacking: Thirteen (13) A/C (including two (2) PFF A/C)
were dispatched with “A” squadron. A/C #891 was unable to assemble with “A”
squadron and joined the 486^th “D” squadron of the 4^th “C” group. A/C #891 did
not attack because the lead could not pick up the target and returned its bombs
to base. A/C #859 and #910 left the formation early and attacked targets of
opportunity. All other A/C attacked the secondary target visually.

3. Lost aircraft: no A/C were lost on today’s mission.

486^th “B” Squadron

1. General narrative: Fourteen (14) A/C (including two (2) PFF A/C) were
scheduled to fly as the 486^th “B” squadron. Take-off was as planned from 0915
to 0935 hours, and by 1020 hours, the squadron had formed and was in position
on the lead. No difficulties were encountered during assembly.

The lead squadron was followed on to the I.P. and at that point, the
squadron peeled off and made a visual run on the target. Haze and sun glare prevented
the target from being easily identified but the target was picked up and synchronization
completed. However, no bombs were dropped on the primary target because
of a bombsight salvo switch malfunction. Still in trail behind “A” squadron, “B”
squadron proceeded to the secondary target, turned on the selected I.P. and made
a visual run on the target. After bombs away on the squadron lead’s release at
1451 hours, rally was effected as planned, and the position was again resumed in
the group formation. For a general narrative of the mission, as flown, refer to
the above report of the 486^th “A” squadron.

2. Aircraft not attacking: there were fourteen (14) A/C (including two
(2) PFF A/C) dispatched with “B” squadron. A/C #937 attacked the primary target,
and the rest of squadron proceeded to the secondary target, attacking visually.

3. Lost aircraft: No A/C were lost on the day’s mission.

486^th “C” squadron

1. General narrative: Fourteen (14) A/C including two (2) PFF A/C were
scheduled to fly as the “C” squadron on today’s mission. Take-off was as scheduled
from 0921 to 0946 hours, followed by climb to assembly altitude where position was taken
on the lead squadron at 1021 hours with no difficulties being encountered.

The low squadron followed the lead on on in to the target, and at the I.P.,
prepared to make a visual bomb run on the primary target. Haze and sun glare
prevented target from being picked up in time and the squadron (still in trail)
proceeded to the selected I.P. for the secondary target and made a visual bomb run.
Bombs were dropped on the squadron lead’s release at 1454 hours (about forty-five
(45) seconds late because the bomb bay doors on the lead A/C were not fully open).
Rally was effected as planned and position in group maintained on route back. For
a general narrative of the mission as flown, refer to the report above for the
486^th “A” squadron
2. Aircraft not attacking: there were fourteen (14) A/C including two (2)
PFF A/C dispatched with “C” squadron. A/C #970 left the formation early and
attacked a target of opportunity. All other A/C attacked the secondary target,
visually.

3. Lost aircraft: No A/C were lost on today’s mission.

486^th “D” squadron
4^th “D” (Composite 94^th , 486^th, 487^th) group

1. General narrative: The 486^th group scheduled twelve (12) A/C (including
two (2) PFF A/C) to fly as the high squadron of the 4^th “C” group. Take-off was
as scheduled from 0905 to 0948 hours. The squadron was not completely formed
(two A/C were still missing from the formation) when the 4^th “C” group leader
was joined at 1018 hours. First point on the wing assembly line (buncher #22) was
crossed at 1022 hours, three (3) minutes late. Timings were nearly perfect on
balance of assembly line, and proper position was assumed in the wing formation.
After departing CP#1 at 1105 ½ hours three and one-half (3 ½ ) minutes late at an
altitude of 9,500’ , climb to bombing altitude was begun. The Belgian coast was
crossed at 1144 hours, ten (10) minutes late. A near briefed course was flown
in to the I.P. where the group peeled off for bombing by squadrons. The mickey
set failed at the I.P. , and a visual run on the primary target was planned. Just
before the time of release, the bombardier’s gyro tumbled and bombardier was
Unable to complete the run. A visual run was made on the secondary target after
a turn off a selected I.P. Ground haze and sun glare obscured the area, preventing
the bombardier from identifying the target of opportunity. None could be found,
and the squadron rejoined the 4^th “C” group and proceeded on route out.

A near briefed course was followed on route out. Let down to minimum
altitude was normal, and the Belgian coast was crossed at 1614 hours. From
Ostende, a direct route was taken for base, and landings were effected without
incident from 1655 to 1708 hours.

2. Aircraft not attacking: twelve (12) A/C , including two (2) PFF A/C,
were dispatched with “D” squadron. A/C #891 (not included in the above figures)
joined the formation because it could not find its own 4th “F” group. All A/C
failed to attack the primary target because the gyro tumbles just prior to bomb
release and the secondary target because ground haze and sun glare prevented
target from being picked up. All A/C received sorties and bombs were returned
to base.

3. Lost aircraft: No A/C were lost on today’s mission.

487^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Air leaders narrative report for mission of 24 December 1944

TO:                 Commanding officer, 487^th bombardment group, APO559

1. General narrative. Take-off was at 0900 and assembly was
made at 7,000 feet. I was flying deputy to general castle. Wing
and division assembly was made on time and in perfect weather. The
climb was started on leaving the English coast. We reached Belgium
at 1130, still climbing. We reached altitude at CP3 and had just
levelled off when we were attacked by fighters, causing the lead aircraft
to abort. We took over the lead, still being attacked by fighters.
After the attack was over we only had two squadron so we
continued on course with a lead and high squadron.

We made the turn before the I.P. too quickly but I called
HOTSHOT Baker and told him we going to make the I.P. good anyway; so,
he echeloned to the left-hand. There was no interference at the I.P.
KODAK red had given us target weather so we peeled off by squadrons
and made a visual run on the primary target. The run was made at
22,500 feet, 150 I.A.S., on A.F.C.E. with a heading of 221 degrees.
Bombs were away at 1415. The route out was as briefed.

Meager flak was encountered on the route in, about 20
miles southeast of Liege. Fighter support for our group was nil
when we were hit and was only fair overt the complete route.

2. Aircraft not attacking. 35 A/C plus 3 PFF took off in
the 487^th main group. 43-38002, in the low squadron, aborted over
enemy territory with engine failure; he is credited with a sortie.
43-37969, in the low squadron, returned early from engineering but
attacked on the way out. 43-38169, in the high squadron, returned
early but attacked.
The following aircraft were MIA before target due to
enemy aircraft. In the low squadron: 44-8121 (PFF), 42-102497,
43-37569, 43-38926, 44-8192, 44-8614. In the lead squadron: 44-8444,
PFF.
A/C 43-37979 landed in France. The crew is safe, but the
aircraft was abandoned. This A/C was in the lead squadron.
A/C 44-8530 and A/C 42-98014 landed at Woodbridge.
Twenty-seven aircraft plus two PFF attacked.

490^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of 93^rd “B” group leader.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 490^th bombardment group (H), AAF

General narrative:

1. Group formed over splasher #6 in a hurry as the time for forming was
short, so when we left the splasher the ships were all trailing in formation,
but approximately in position. We reached buncher #28 on time in behind the
34^th bomb group who was a little early. The interval was closed up and control
point #1 was made on time. After leaving the coast, message was reached that
hotshot ships were six (6) minutes late. Control point # was made slightly
late but here the wing started “S” ing to hold proper position in the division line.

2. The division stream ahead of the 93^rd wing was twelve to fifteen (12 to 15)
miles North of the route and over ran the turn Northwest of Frankfurt, causing
our wing to turn off to the left to get in trail on the run from the I.P. to the target.
Our lead squadron was close upon the 34^th low at times of bombs away and due to
C-1 malfunction we believed we hit slightly over the target.

3. Rally point was made good and the high and low squadrons fell into
formation shortly thereafter to fly the route home as briefed.

4. Fighter protection was very good.

5. VHF communication clear but discipline poor.

6. Fighters did not have sufficient gas to stay with us on the long route
around the flak area and the flak was very light and inaccurate. In the future,
recommend that shorter route home be used.

SUBJECT:     Report of squadron leader.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 490^th bombardment group (H), AAF

490^th “B” squadron – 93^rd “B” group.

General Narrative:

1. The high squadron formed in good order over splasher #6 and left on
course on time. The “A” wing was one (1) minute early at the wing assembly
point but the interval between the “A” and “B” wing was closed up at control
point #1. Control point #2 was made six (6) minutes late due to “hot shot”
ships ahead of our wing being late. This caused considerable “S” in which
continued to the I.P.

2. Bombs from the high squadron were away at 1506 and the bombardier
reported results as good. A visual run was made. The squadron re-assembled
with the group at the R.P. and flew the briefed route to base.

3. Flak was encountered near the town of Marche, Belgium and at the
target and was meager and inaccurate,

4. All but one aircraft returned to base on the briefed course.
Aircraft 43-38687 not yet returned.

SUBJECT:     Report of squadron leader.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 490^th bombardment group (H), AAF

490^th “C” squadron – 93^rd “B” group.

General narrative:

1. The low squadron formed over Splasher #6 without incident and made
the assembly route, reaching the wing assembly point one (1) minute early.
The time was lost before control point #2 and because of preceding groups
considerable “S” ing was necessary.

2. Bombs were away at 1507 and hit long.

3. Flak along route to the target and at the target it was meager and
inaccurate.

4. All aircraft returned to base.

SUBJECT:     Report of squadron leader.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 490^th bombardment group (H), AAF

490^th “C” squadron – 93^rd “D” group.

General narrative:

1. The low squadron of the composite group took off between 0935 and
0945 and made an S.O.P. ascent to the 11,000 foot assembly altitude over
Splasher #6.

2. Take-off of the squadron leader was delayed about thirty (30) minutes
and as soon as airborne, instructions were given to the deputy to take over and
assemble the squadron.

3. At 1045, just as the squadron leader was reaching altitude, instructions
were given the deputy to proceed with squadron to Buncher #27 in order
to enable assembling the composite group ten (10) minutes prior to departure
for wing assembly.

4. The squadron leader intercepted the composite group at Buncher #26
beginning of the wing assembly line, and trailed thru the wing assembly
maneuvering for position to take over the lead. Instruction were given the
deputy to cut short on turns and try to close up his squadron into a better
group formation.

5. During the division assembly the leader got into the number 2 position
and took over the squadron lead. By starting climb early and cutting short the
turns both on departing the English coast and upon arriving at the continental
coast the low squadron managed to get into a good group formation.

6. Climb was continued on to bombing altitude of about 24,300 feet and
group formation flown to the I.P.

7. Peel off at the I.P. was fairly good considering the interference from
other formation which were off course and had overshot the I.P. A visual
run was made but results were hard to estimate from incendiaries. Pictures
show the bombing to be fair.

8. A fair rally was made and the 93^rd “D” preceded out descending to
about 4,000 feet upon reaching the Belgium coast.

9. No enemy fighters were seen and flak was light but fairly accurate.

10. About the Belgium coast squadrons of the 93^rd “D” were given clearance
to proceed individually to their bases. The low squadron preceded back to
Splasher #6 flying night formation and hold 4,000 feet altitude until cleared
by the tower. About 1830 to descend and peel off the formation over the field.

493^rd BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer – mission 24 December 1944 -
Frankfurt A/F and Darmstadt, Germany.
TO:                 Commanding officer, 493^rd bombardment group (H), APO 559.

1. General narrative:

493^rd “A”, “B” and “C” squadrons – 93^rd “C” group

Take-off, climb and assembly: take-off, climb and assembly was good.
Group assembly very good. Had too much time at buncher. Wing assembly was
a bit congested by 34^th stating they would be one minute late and they ended
up one minute early. Good division formation assembly.

Route out: control point times by 493^rd made in trail of wing leader.
Wing was to left of bomber stream, at very few points was wing in trail of bomber
stream. Too much “S” ing. Formation not too good within groups.

Target area: briefed route not followed. Too much deviation along route.
I.P. mad good by 493. The target was hit. Sharp left turn as briefed brought
493^rd ahead of 490^th at R.P. Low squadron of 490^th trailed over target and
about got away of 493^rd close behind.

Route back and descent: route back O.K. poor formation. Squadron left
group formation at coast out, circled buncher #27 until called in by base.

Flak encountered: flak areas at lines, N of I.P. and over target encountered.
Flak over lines was tracking and fairly accurate. Numerous rockets over target area.

Fighter support: support seemed thin. Good when fighter attack ahead was
announced.

Comments? And suggestions: (1) leaders stick to briefed course. (2) Too
much VHF chatter. (3) Squadrons within group formation stay closed-up. High
squadron of 490^th was trailing behind and hindered movements of 493^rd.

493^rd “D” squadron – 93^rd “D” group.

Take-off, climb and assembly: take-off good – group assembly good – wing
assembly good except for 490^th composite flying low squadron on 93 “D”. Division
assembly O.K.

Route out: route out rather rough – due to excessive “S” ing by wing leader.
Timings late due to increased tread winds. Formation good in lead squadron and
Hi-Low squadron poor on assembly and throughout route in.

Target area: I.P. made good. Run approximately 285°. R.P. made good and
briefed route followed out. No congestion in target area.

Route back and descent: route back as briefed – descent – S.O.P.

Flak encountered: on route in about 05 50E about 16 guns. Meager -
fairly accurate.

Fighter support: seemed a little thin.

Comments and suggestions: none

493^rd “E” squadron – 45^th “E” group.

Take-off, climb and assembly: routine assembly of 493^rd E squadron was
made good over buncher 27. 45^th E group was met over buncher 20 on time and
no difficulty was encountered.

Route out: times on assembly were made good by 45^th E group leaving coast
2 minutes late. From that point on all timings were late.

Target area: bombing was done by squadrons. 45^th E high and lead squadrons
failed to drop on primary. 493^rd E squadron which was low on 45^th E group dropped
on the primary, visually with a PFF assist. Rally point was not made good by
45^th E. 45^th E went on to bomb last resort at Stuttgart. 493^rd E squadron did
not stay with 45^th E on this run, after receiving permission from 45^th E leader
to leave. There was no congestion in target area.

Route back and descent: routine.

Flak encountered: Moderate – accurate – over battle lines. No flak over
target.

Fighter support: saw very few fighters

Comments and suggestions: none.

2. Aircraft not attacking:

493^rd “A” squadron – 93^rd “C”group.

Twelve aircraft, including two PFF aircraft, left this base and assembled
in the formation as shown in attached diagram “A”
Of these twelve aircraft, eleven including the PFF aircraft, passed over and
bombed the primary target, Frankfurt-Rhein A/F, Germany.

Aircraft 43-38195 turned back early after reaching enemy territory, because
of an engine failure. This aircraft did not attack. Not attacking – sortie.

Therefore eleven aircraft, including the PFF aircraft, in the 493^rd “A”
squadron are considered attacking and twelve aircraft are credited with sorties.

Formation over the target is shown in attached diagram “B”

493^rd “B” squadron, 93^rd “C” group.

Fourteen aircraft, including one PFF, left this base and assembled
in the formation as shown in attached diagram “A”

Of these fourteen aircraft, thirteen including the PFF aircraft, passed over,
but only twelve bombed the primary target, Frankfurt-Rhein A/F. Germany.

Aircraft 43-38340 passed over, but did not bomb the primary target because
of rack malfunction. This aircraft later bombed a target of opportunity at Darmstadt, Germany.
This aircraft is considered attacking and is credited with a sortie.

Aircraft 43-38993 turned back before reaching the primary target because of
battle damage to number 4 engine. This aircraft bombed a target of opportunity
at ????baden, Germany. Attacking – sortie.

Therefore fourteen aircraft, including the PFF aircraft, of the 493^rd “B”
squadron, are considered attacking and are credited with sorties.

Formation over the target is shown in attached diagram “B”

493^rd “C” squadron – 93^rd “C” group.

Thirteen aircraft, including one PFF aircraft, left this base and assembled in
the formation as shown in attached diagram “A”.

Of these thirteen aircraft, twelve passed over, but only eight bombed the primary
target, Frankfurt-Rhein A/F, Germany

Aircraft 44-6477 and 43-38613 failed to bomb because of rack malfunctions, but
later bombed a target of opportunity at Mainz, Germany. These aircraft are considered
attacking and credited with a sortie.

Aircraft 43-38314 passed over, but did not bomb the primary target. This aircraft
later bombed a target of opportunity at Erbenheim, Germany, and is therefore considered
attacking and credited with a sortie.

Aircraft 43-38223 passed over, but did not bomb the primary target because of a
rack malfunction. This aircraft later bombed a target of opportunity at Wiesbaden,
Germany, and is considered attacking and credited with a sortie.

Aircraft 43-38558 was a return early spare.

Therefore, twelve aircraft, including the PFF aircraft of the 493^rd “C” squadron
are considered attacking and are credited with sorties.

Formation over the target is shown in attached diagram “B”

493^rd “D” squadron – 93^rd “D” group

Twelve aircraft, including two PFF aircraft, left this base and assembled in the
formation as shown in attached diagram “A”

Of these twelve aircraft, eleven passed over and bombed the primary target,
Frankfurt-Rhein A/F, Germany

Aircraft 43-38242 was a return early spare.

Therefore, eleven aircraft, including the PFF aircraft of the 493^rd “D”
squadron are considered attacking and are credited with sorties

Formation over the target is shown in attached diagram “B”

493^rd “E” squadron – 45^th  “E” group

Thirteen aircraft, including one PFF aircraft, left this base and assembled
in the formation as shown in attached diagram “A”. This squadron assembled
as the low squadron in the 45^th E Group.

Of these thirteen aircraft, all passed over and bombed their primary target,
the Darmstadt A/F, Germany.

Therefore, thirteen aircraft, including the PFF aircraft of the 493^rd “E”
squadron are considered attacking and are credited with sorties.

Formation over the target is shown in attached diagram “B”

3. Aircraft lost: no aircraft lost.

91st BG

General narrative

Headquarter
Ninety first bombardment group (H) Army Air Forces
APO 557

26 December 1944.

SUBJECT:     Report of Operations Officer, Mission 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding Officer, 91^st Bombardment Group (H) APO 557

1. Targets assigned:      Kirch Gons A/D, Germany (1^st “C” Group)
Merzhauzen A/D, Germany (1^st “D” Group)
Targets attacked:       Kirch Gons A/D, Germany (1^st “C” Group)
Merzhauzen A/D, Germany (1^st “D” Group)

2. Fifty-two aircraft, including four PFF aircraft, formed the lead squad-
ron of the 1^st “C” Group and the entire 1^st “D” Group, with thirteen aircraft
in each squadron. Forty-nine aircraft including all four PFF aircraft,
attacked their assigned primary targets; three aircraft failed to attack. No
losses were sustained.

3. General narrative, lead squadron, 1^st “C” Group: Thirteen aircraft,
including one PFF, took off from 1031-1044 hours to form the lead
squadron of the 1^st “C” Group, the low and high squadrons being furnished by
the 398^th and 381^st groups respectively. The take-off was delayed by ground
fog and by the large number of aircraft taking off from this base, including
a number of aircraft of 303^rd bombardment Group. The assembly was made
at 11000Feet over Bassingbourn Buncher. Departure from the base was
on time and on course, and immediately thereafter the formation let down to
10,000 feet as briefed. The 1^st “B” group was late in taking off because of
weather, so this group moved in that position, immediately in trail of the
1^st “A” Group. The English Coast was departed on time and on course at
Clacton.

After leaving the English coast the formation started its climb to
bombing altitude, 22,000 feet. The continental coast crossed at Ostend at
1228 Hours at 17,500 Feet, and the formation continued its SOP climb on
course, with an excellent interval being maintained. Before the formation
arrived at the I.P., a message from the scouting force reported that the target
weather conditions were excellent for visual bombing. The I.P. was reached at
1415 hours at 22,000 Feet, the formation cutting the I.P. a little short. Bombs
were away at 1429 hours from the same altitude. Bombing was visual and excel-
lent results were observed.

On the withdrawl this formation flew slightly right of course and in
the area of the front-lines made frequent minor variations in course to avoid
uncharted flak which had been noticed both on the way in and ahead on the way
out. The formation flew at 22,000 Feet until about 1530, when it began its
let-down, continuing it down to 2,000 feet. The continental coast was crossed
at 1552 Hours at 12,500 Feet, the English coast at Felixstowe at 1616 Hours
at 4,500 Feet, and Bury St Edmunds was reached at 1700 at 2,000 Feet, the
formation having been diverted there because of extremely poor weather condit-
ions prevailing at Bassingbourn.

No enemy fighters were observed. Fighter support was good

Weather was as briefed except the base weather at the end of the
mission. The base was completely closed in so aircraft had to be diverted
to Bury St. Edmunds.

Flak was light and inaccurate over the front lines both on the penet-
ration and withdrawl.

4. Aircraft not attacking: A/C 43-38946 had a crash landing seven min-
utes after take-off. A/C 43-37993, although over the target, failed to attack
because of bomb rack malfunction; it is credited with a sortie.

5. Aircraft losses: No aircraft failed to return, but reference is
made to the crash landing mentioned in paragraph below

1. General narrative, lead squadron, 1^st “D” Group: Thirteen aircraft,
including one PFF aircraft, took off from 1047-1113 Hours to form the lead
squadron of 1^st “D” Group. Persistent ground fog had delayed the take-
off for about twenty-five minutes. The weather at the assembly altitude of
8,000 Feet was excellent and the assembly of the 1^st “C” Group was accomplish-
ed without difficulty. The base was finally departed twelve minutes late
and the formation headed directly for control point #1 in order to make up
the lost time. The formation had by this time climbed to 10,000 Feet as brief-
ed. When the English coast was reached this group took its interval on the
41^st “B” Group and started its climb to bombing altitude, leaving the English
coast at Clacton at 1216 hours at 10,000 Feet.

The continental coast was reached at 17,500 Feet at Ostend at 1252
Hours, the formation following the briefed course. Bombing altitude was reach-
ed at 1337 Hours. Prior to reaching I.P., the formation was advised by
Buckeye, the weather scouting force, that the target was open but that ground
snow might make the target difficult to pick up. At the I.P. the high and low
squadrons assumed their intervals, the I.P. having been reached at 1434 Hours
at 22,000 Feet. Bombs were away visually at 1453 Hours from 22,000 feet,
with varying degrees of results for the three squadrons. On the bomb run
the high squadron did not uncover the low squadron, so the former consequent-
ly found it necessary to make a 360° turn and a second run on the target.
Their bombs were away at 1459 hours. The rally of the lead and low squadrons
was effected with no difficulty. After the target, the high squadron cut
the next two turns short in order to re-join the lead and low squadrons.

Bombing altitude was maintained on withdrawl until after crossing
the enemy lines, where a let-down was begun. The continental coast was
recrossed at 51-18N, 03-04E at 1552 Hours at 12,500 Feet, and the English
coast at Felixstowe at 1616 at 4,500 Feet. The squadrons proceeded to
their stand-off points and were then diverted to Bury St Edmunds, where
landings were made, in view of the fact that Bassingbourn was completely
closed in.

No enemy fighters were encountered; fighter support was good.

Light and accurate flak was encountered over the front lines.

Weather was as briefed except at the base upon the return

4. Aircraft not attacking: all thirteen aircraft attacked the target.

5. Aircraft losses: No losses were sustained.

1. General narrative, Low squadron, 1^st “D”group: Thirteen aircraft,
including one PFF aircraft, took off from 1050-1118 Hours to form the low
squadron of the 1^st “D” Group. The assembly was accomplished without diff-
iculty and the entire mission was flown in company with the rest of the 1^st
“D” Group. Reference is made to the narrative of the leader of the lead
group for a more complete description of the entire mission. Aircraft of
this squadron were diverted to Bury St Edmunds upon completion of the
mission.

2. Aircraft not attacking: 42-97061 turned back before leaving England,
landing at Ridgewell.

3. Aircraft losses: No losses were sustained.

1. General narrative, High Squadron, 1^st “D” Group: Thirteen aircraft,
including one PFF aircraft. Took off from 1049-1106 Hours to form the high
squadron of the 1^st “D” Group. The assembly was accomplished without diffi-
culty and the entire mission was flown in company with the rest of the 1^st
“D” Group except for a time when this squadron made a 360° turn and a second
run the target, then cutting short a couple of turns to catch up with the
rest of that formation. Reference is made to the narrative of the leader of
this group for a more complete description of the mission. Aircraft
of this squadron were diverted to Bury St Edmunds upon their return to
England.

2. Aircraft not attacking: all thirteen aircraft attacked the target.

3. Aircraft losses: No losses were sustained.

92nd BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report on planning and execution of operational mission, 24 December
1944, Target:                    Giessen A/C – Nidda.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 92^nd bombardment group (H) AAF, APO #557

1. Comment on planning and execution.
a. The bomb loading for this operation was received from head-
quarters 40^th combat wing by Capt. Stroud at 2335 hours, 23 December 1944.
The order called for Forty-one B-17’s plus 4 PFF aircraft and any other A/C
we could put up to be loaded with max 100 Lb. GP bombs, each with no nose
fuse and 1/40 second tail fuse.
b. The field order was received from headquarters 1^st bomb division
by Capt. Stroud at 0540 hours, 24 December 1944. Flight plans and details of
the mission were completed, briefing being set for 0700 hours and take-off
time 1000 hours.

2. General narrative.
a. Thirty-nine (39) aircraft including four (4) PFF aircraft of
the 92^nd bomb group began take-off at 1000 hours for assembly on the Honeybourne
buncher at 6,000, 7,000 and 8,000 feet. These aircraft formed the lead, low
and high squadrons of the 40^th “A” group. This group was the fifth of the 1^st
air division.

b. twelve (12) aircraft including one (1) PFF of the 92^nd bomb group
began take-off at 1035 hours for assembly on splasher 12 at 8,000 feet. These
aircraft formed the high squadron of the composite 40^th “D” group.

c. 40^th “A” group accomplished assembly on the assigned buncher and
departed on course six (6) minutes late. Following the prescribed route over
England the group departed control point one (1) on course, on time. The
briefed route was flown to the I.P. for the primary target. At the I.P. the
squadrons took interval for visual bombing. The lead and high squadrons bombed
individually on the first run with the lead squadron’s bombs away at 1442 hours,
from 21,600 feet true, on a true heading of 050 degrees. The high squadron
bombs away at 1442 hours, from 22,200 feet true, on a true heading of 062 deg.
The low squadron made a second run, bombing at 1501 ½ hours, from 21,600 feet
true, on a heading of 069 degrees true. The bombing of all three squadrons was
excellent.
d. The lead and high squadrons executed a 360 degrees turn at the
rally point, but the low squadron did not rendezvous with them. Then briefed
route out was followed by all three squadrons crossing the Belgium coast on
course and entering England at Clacton. From Clacton the squadrons returned
directly to base. The low squadron was diverted to Bury St. Edmunds because
of nil visibility at base.

c. The 40^th “D” high squadron was delayed on take-off because of an
accident. The squadron assembled, but was unable to locate 40^th “D” lead and
low squadrons at control point 1. Departing that point 13 minutes late the
squadron proceeded along the briefed route to the target alone. The squadron
attacked a target of opportunity through mistaken identity with good results.

d. At the rally point the group swung south of course to avoid
another group, but returned to course and withdrew as briefed to Clacton
where they took a direct course to base. Five A/C from this squadron were
diverted because of weather conditions at base.

e. In the 40^th “A” force, 29 A/C attacked the primary target, eight
(8) targets of opportunity, one (1) was unknown. The 40^th “D” force, eleven (11)
A/C attacked the same target and one (1) A/C another target of opportunity.

3. A/C Failing to attack.
a. A/C #42-38101 crashed on take-off and exploded. Six men were
killed, 3 men seriously wounded. A/C salvaged.

4. A/C lost.
a. A/C #1574 GH-PFF (A/C of 303^rd Bomb group) took off at 1047
hours. This A/C did not join our formation and no report has been received
since take-off

b. A/C #44-8022 – A/C took off at 1024 hours, hit by flak over
enemy territory and A/C failed to return to base. Four (4) crew members
are reported as being safe in France.

c. A/C #44-6017 – A/C took off at 1013 hours, hit by flak over
enemy territory and failed to return to base. Eight (8) crew members re-
ported safe in England  and one (1) crewmember reported in a hospital in
Belgium.

d. A/C #44-8172 – A/C took off at 1025 hours, hit by flak over
enemy territory and eight (8) crew members reported safe in England, and
one (1) crew member in a hospital in France. This A/C was forced to land
on a airdrome near Lille and crew abandoned plane.

e. A/C #42-97870 took off at 1015 hours and completed the mission.
Aircraft crashed at diversion field, six (6) crew members were killed, two
(2) seriously injured and one (1) is missing. A/C salvaged.

303rd BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     41^ST Combat wing “A” group, lead squadron leader’s narrative of
combat mission flown 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding general, 41^st combat wing, APO 557, U.S. Army

1. We took off from Bassingbourn in a PFF-GH A/C with 13 regular A/C to
fly lead squadron of the 41^st combat wing “A” group. Assembly was made over
Harrington buncher at 10,000 feet with all A/C making assembly. We departed
the buncher in group formation on time on course. Combat wing assembly was
made as briefed. The route over England was as briefed and without incident.
We departed control point #1 a minute late. The continent was crossed seven
minutes late slightly south of course to avoid prop wash of preceding groups
we made our I.P. good with perfect visibility for the bomb run. Our AFCE
worked well on the bomb run. Bombs were away at 1448 ½ hours from 22,000 feet,
indicated altitude on a magnetic heading of 76 degrees. Group rally was made
off the target and we maintained this position to the English coast. We came
back to splasher 16 at which time we were notified to divert to Snetterton
Heath. All 14 A/C landed there with us.

2. No enemy fighters were identified. Friendly fighter support was good.

3. Meager and inaccurate flak was encountered on the route to the target.

SUBJECT:     41^ST Combat wing “A” group, low squadron leader’s narrative of
combat mission flown 24 December 1944

TO:                 Commanding officer, 303^rd bombardment group (H), APO 557, U.S. Army

1. We took off from Bassingbourn in a PFF-GH A/C with 13 regular A/C to
fly low squadron of the 41^st combat wing “A” group. Assembly was made at 9,000
feet over the Harrington buncher with all A/C making assembly. We departed the
buncher in group formation which position was maintained to the I.P. We took
bombing interval 5 minutes before the I.P. Our AFCE worked well on the bomb
run. Bombs were away in good visibility at 1450 hours from 21,400 feet indicated
altitude on a magnetic heading of 76 degrees. We made group rally shortly after
the target and stayed in formation until the English coast was crossed. We
received our diversion message while over splasher 16 so we led the squadron to
Snetterton Heath. 13 A/C landed there, and the 14^th A/C which returned early
landed at Ridgewell.

2. We saw 2 enemy fighters one of which was shot down.

3. Meager flak was encountered as we crossed the enemy lines.

SUBJECT:     Narrative report of mission – 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, AAF station 107, APO 557, U.S. Army

1. Forty-two A/C from this group were dispatched this date to attack
the landing ground at Merzhausen, near Frankfurt, Germany. There was no
secondary or past resort target specified, but the field order stated that
A/C or formations becoming separated from their units should attack the
Lutsel M/Y in Koblenz, Germany. These A/C flew as the “A” group in the
41^st combat wing and were led by Lt. Col. William S. Raper. In addition
two A/C flew with the 92^nd group with crews from that group, four A/C flew
with 96^th group, three with crews from that group and one with a mixed
crew, and two A/C flew with the 388^th group with crews from this group. The
field order had directed that all available A/C and crews should fly on the
mission.|

2. Seven A/C took off this station, thirty-five from Bassingbourn,
two from Poddington, four from Snetterton heath, and two from Knettishall.
As the base was closed in on return, the A/C had to be diverted to Snetter-
ton Heath. On eof the A/C flying with the 92^nd group is missing, but there
were no casulaties among personnel from this group.

3. Two A/C returned early, A/C 42-97949, Lt. Gebrecht, 358^th squadron,
and A/C 43-38645, Lt Weaver, 359^th squadron, both due to mechanical
difficulties.

4. Forty A/C dropped a total of 1446 x 100 G.P. bombs on Merzhauzen
A/F with excellent results. The six A/C flying with the 3^rd division dropped
a total of 168 x 100 G.P. bombs on Darmstadt A/F.

5. A few E/A were seen, but there were no attacks on this group.
Some meager and fairly accurate A/A gunfire was encountered over the battle
lines and in the Rhine river area. One A/C sustained major battle damage and
four minor damage.

6. Weather was CAVU in the target area, but ground fog at base on
return forced a diversion of the A/C to Snetterton Heath.

7. Friendly fighter support was good.

305th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Narrative report of operation – Giessen airfield (hangar) (Gr) – Nidda air-
field and air park (Landing area) (Gr), 24 December, 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 305^th bombardment group (H), AAF, APO 557.

1. Description of mission planned.
a. The bomb loading for this operation was received from headquarters,
40^th combat bombardment wing by telephone at 0020A, 24 December , 1944. The order called
for forty-eight (48) aircraft, including five (5) PFF aircraft. The loading was as fol-
lows (forty-nine (49) aircraft were loaded and dispatched):

No. of A/C                            Loading                                                     fusing
32                       12x 500GP Mark 12 Navy           1/100 sec nose – 1/100 sec tail.

3(PFF)                 12x 500GP Mark 12 Navy           1/100 sec nose – 1/100 sec tail.
2 – skymarkers

1(PFF)                10x 500GP Mark 12 Navy           1/100 sec nose – 1/100 sec tail.

12                       38x 100GP (AN-M30)                      No Nose – 1/40 sec tail.

1(PFF)                38x 100GP (AN-M30)                      No Nose – 1/40 sec tail.
2- skymarkers

b. The 1BD field order was received by teletype at 0545A, 24 December,
1944, and the 40CBW supplement was received by the same means at 2333A, 23 December,
1944. Flight plans and details of the mission were completed, briefing being set for
0650A and take-off time 0950A.

c. The 305^th bombardment group – lead sq. – 40CBW “C” group – was the 19^th
squadron of the attacking force which consisted of 42 squadrons (1^st Bomb. Div).

d. The 305^th bombardment group – low sq. – 40CBW “C” group – was the 20^th
squadron of the attacking force which consisted of 42 squadrons (1^st Bomb. Div).

e. The 305^th bombardment group – high sq. – 40CBW “C” group – was the 21^st
squadron of the attacking force which consisted of 42 squadrons (1^st Bomb. Div).

f. The 305^th bombardment group – low-sq. – 40CBW “D” group -  was the 23^rd
squadron of the attacking force which consisted of 42 squadrons (1^st Bomb Div).

g. The 305^th bombardment group formations were led by the following list-
ed personnel:

Lead sq. – 40-C group                                                  Low s. – 40-C group
P:   Maj O.W. Shelton                                                       P:   1^st Lt. A.W. Wagner
CP: 1^st Lt. D.L. Waltz                                                      CP: 1^st Lt. W.J. Schreiber
N:   1^st Lt. P.L. Davidson                                                                     N:   2^nd Lt. A. Friedman
N:   2^nd Lt. R. Gordon                                                      V:   2^nd Lt. J.M. Tewel
V:   1^st Lt. M.G. Wallace                                                 B:   1^st Lt. D.V. McVoy
B:   1^st Lt. C.L. Hunter

High sq. – 40-C group                                                  Low sq. – 40-D group
P:   1^st Lt. R.E. Roy                                                          P:   1^st Lt. J.T. Berry
CP: Capt. W.J. Cook                                                         CP: 1^st Lt. J.D. Wolhnupt??
N:   1^st Lt. H. Jones, Jr                                                   N:   1^st Lt. J.F. Corrigan??
V:   1^st Lt G.E. Nelson                                                     V:   2^nd Lt. E.L. Tversky
B:   1^st Lt. R.W. Johnson                                                B:   1^st Lt. W.J. Hustend??

2. Description of mission.
a. 40CBW “C” group         (1) The aircraft of the 305^th bombardment group sched-
uled to form the 40CBW “C” group took off on time, assembled over podington at 7,000 feet
and moved out on course on time. The group flew briefed route to point “J” where a dog-
leg was made to the right to let the 40CBW “A” group move into position. The group then
flew briefed route to the target.

(2) Before reaching the I.P. the group leader was able
to see the target so the squadrons took interval at the I.P. and each squadron made a visual
run on the target with good bombing results.

(3) After bombs were released the lead and low squad-
rons rallyed and returned to England along the briefed route. On the turn away from the
target the high squadron was cut off by a B-24 group and was unable to re-join the lead
and low squadrons but followed along in trail to England maintaining visual contact with
the lead and low squadrons.

(4) The three (3) squadrons returned to Honeybourne
buncher and circled until diversion orders were received and proceded to the diver-
sionary airdromes.

(5) Meagre, fairly accurate, AAGF was encountered at
the enemy lines and at the target. No enemy aircraft were encountered.

b. Low sq. – 40CBW “D” group              (1) The aircraft of the 305^th bombardment
group scheduled to form the low squadron of the 40^th “D” group took off on time and as-
sembled with the lead squadron furnished by the 306^th bomb Gp. (H) at 6,000 feet over
splasher no. 12. The group moved out on course on time and flew briefed route to point
“K” where a dog-leg was made to the right to get into proper CBW position and the group
then flew briefed route to the target.

(2) The squadron took interval at the I.P.
and made visual run on the target but failed to pick up the target on the first approach
in time to bomb. The squadron then made a 290 degree turn to the left and made a second
run on the target but due to faulty identification dropped short of the target.

(3) After bombs were released the squadron
rejoined the lead squadron and proceeded slightly south of the briefed route to past
the enemy lines and then followed briefed route to England.

(4) The squadron leader received diversion
message in the vicinity of Watford and proceeded directly top diversionary landing field.

(5) Meagre AAGF was encountered at the enemy
lines on the way back from the target. No enemy aircraft were encountered.

3. Aircraft not attacking.
a. 40CBW “C” group                                 (1) Thirty-six (36) aircraft, including four (4) PFF
aircraft took off for this formation. A/C 42-39943 turned back before reaching enemy
territory, A/C 43-38109 attacked a target of opportunity at Herrmarnstein (5035N-0630E)
(Gr) and all other aircraft attacked the primary target.

b. Low sq - 40CBW “D” group               (1) Thirteen (13) aircraft, including one
(1) PFF aircraft took off for this formation and all aircraft attacked the primary tar-
get.

4. Aircraft lost.
a. 40CBW “C” group                                 (1) none.

b. Low sq – 40CBW “D” group               (1) none.

5. Statistical summary.

lead               low                 high              low                 total
40-C              40-C              40-C              40-D
a. A/C dispatched ………………….  12++               12+                 12+                 13+                  49
b. A/C Disp. Less unused spares ..    12++               12+                 12+                 13+                  49
c. Number of sorties ………………  12++               12+                 11+                 13+                  48
d. A/C attacking primary target .  12++               12+                 10+                 13+                  47
e. A/C attacking tgt of opport ….  0                     0                     1                     0                      1
f. A/C not attacking ………………. 0                     0                     1                     0                      1
g. A/C lost …………………………… 0                     0                     0                     0                      0

+ - Includes one (1) PFF aircraft.
++ - Includes two (2) PFF aircraft.

306^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Report of operations officer – mission of 24 December 1944 – Giessen,
and, Nidda, Germany.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 306^th bombardment group (H), APO 557.

40^th “B” Lead

1. General narrative:

a. Lead plane of the 40^th “B” group took off at 1006 hours to bomb
a target at Giessen, Germany. Take-off was on instruments due to heavy fog.
The squadron and group assembly was SOP over Mt. Farm which was departed
four minutes late. Point “N” was omitted to make good time. The air divi-
sion assembly was accomplished and the squadron departed the English coast 5
minutes late.

b. Route to the target was as ordered although late at all turning
points due to change in the winds from those forecast. Bombing was visual on
the primary target with good observed results confirmed by strike photos.
Weather in target area was CAVU.

c. After bombing the group did not turn off the target as planned,
going wide and intercepting the briefed course 35 minutes later. From this
point return to England was as ordered. Message was received indicating diver-
sion airdromes as base was closed in, and lead plane landed at Debach at
1816 hours. 40^th “B” group was number 6 in the first air division.

d. Friendly fighter support was very good throughout and no enemy
aircraft were observed. Flak was meager generally inaccurate.

2. Aicraft not attacking:

a. The lead squadron was made up of 2 PFF planes plus 8 A?C, two
planes having failed to take-off due to mechanical failure. The 10 A/C
attacked the primary target, Giessen, visually with good results.

3. Lost aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

40^th “B” Low

1. General narrative:

a. Reference is made to narrative of the lead squadron with no
additions. Lead plane took off at 1028 hours and landed at 1844 at Framlingham.

2. Aircraft not attacking:

a. The low squadron was made up of 11 A/C plus one PFF, all of which
attacked the primary target visually with good results.

3. Lost aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

40^th “B” High

1. General narrative:

a. Reference is made to narrative of the lead squadron with no
additions. Lead plane took off at 1016 hours and landed at 1802 at Debach.

2. Aircraft not attacking:

a. The high squadron was made up of 11 A/C plus one PFF plane, all
of which attacked the primary target visually with good results.

3. Lost aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

40^th “D” lead

1. General narrative:

a. Lead squadron of “D” group began taking off at 0948 ½ hours to
bomb a target at Nidda, Germany. Assembly of the lead and low squadrons was
accomplished over fixed buncher 12 but with the exception of the high flight,
the high squadron failed to assemble. Message was received that “A” group was
late and “D” group made a 360° turn north of London, joined air division forma-
tion, and departed the English coast eight minutes late.

b. Route to the target was about as ordered with some deviations to
maintain division formation. A visual run was made on the primary target
but leader’s bombs failed to release. Deputy took over for the second run
and bombs were dropped on his smoke markers with good results. Although smoke
markers of deputy A/C released, his bomb load hung up and was subsequently
dropped on a T/O. weather in the target area was CAVU.

c. Return to England was considerably south of the briefed course.
Message of diversion was received and lead plane landed at 1735 hours at Bury
St. Edmunds. 40^th “D” group was number 8 in the first air division.

d. Friendly support was excellent and no enemy aircraft were observed.
Meager accurate flak was encountered on the way in but none at the target.

2. Aircraft not attacking:

a. The lead squadron was made up of 10 A/C plus 2 PFF planes, all
of which bombed the primary target visually with good results. Although the
deputy lead’s plane’s bomb load did not release, the formation bombed on his
smoke markers and therefore the A/C is carried as attacking the primary target.
This plane later dropped its load on Linz.

3. Lost aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

40^th “D” high (high flight)

1. General narrative:

a. reference is made to narrative of the lead squadron with the follow-
ing additions.

(1) high squadron failed to rendezvous as ordered. The 306^th
high flight, with two stragglers of other group, formed a high squadron and
flew the mission as such.

(2) high flight landed at Bury St. Edmunds with lead squadron.

2. Aircraft not attacking:

a. high flight of high squadron was made up of 3 A/C, all of which
attacked the primary target visually with good results.

3. Lost aircraft:

a. No planes were lost.

Statistical summary

“B” Ld.          “B” Low         “B” High      “D” Ld.          “D” High      Total
No. of A/C dispatched                                                   10                   12                   12                   12                   3                      49
Unused spares                                                                  0                     0                     0                     0                      0                     0
A/C dispatched less unused spares                        10                   12                   12                   12                   3                      49
No. of PFF planes                                                            2                     1                     1                     2                      0                     6
No. of sorties                                                                  10                   12                   12                   12                   3                      49
No. of A/C attacking                                                     10                   12                   12                   12                   3                      49
No. of A/C Not attacking                                             0                     0                     0                     0                      0                     0
No. of A/C lost                                                                  0                     0                     0                     0                      0                     0

351st BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operational narrative.

TO:                 Commanding officer, AAF station 110, APO 557, U.S. Army.

1. Date of mission: 24 December, 1944.

a. Targets attacked: the following targets in Germany were at-
tacked by one or more aircraft: Biblis, Kaiserslautern, Koblenz,
Frankfurt-Rhein-Main, Merzhauzen and Giessen.

b. Position: The spoofing force put up from home base flew alone.
the other aircraft participating in the mission flew with several
other groups in filling out formations.

c. Force:

No. of            Flew
Aircraft      with               Attacked                              Bombs

26                   351^st GP         -                                             -
16                   384^th GP         Biblis                                 320 x 250
1                   457^th GP         Koblenz                                 12 x 500
2                   384^th GP         Kaiserslautern                 40 x 250
2                     91^st GP        Merzhausen                          23 x 500
1                   303^rd GP         Merzhausen                          12 x 500
1                   306^th GP         Giessen                                  11 x 500
1                   305^th GP         Giessen                                  12 x 500
2                   493^rd GP         Frankfurt-                          76 x 100
Rhein-Main

d. Lead Teams:                   Spoofing force:

Leader:                                Major Leonard B. Hoper
Pilot:                                   1^st James M. Purcell
Navigator:                        1^st Lt John W. Bury
Bombardier:                      1^st Lt Alan B. Reed

Biblis Force:

Leader:                                1^st Lt. Wendell Secrest
Pilot:                                   2^nd Lt. Elmer G. Johnson
Navigator:                        1^st Lt. Howard S. Love
Bobardier:                        1^st Lt. Leonard L. Schuler

2. Narrative: (Spoofing force)

a,b. Assembly:                    The twenty-six aircraft comprising of the spoofing force
made good the assembly over the kings cliff buncher at the briefed
altitude of 7,000 feet.

c. Route over England: The briefed route was closely followed over
England. A delayed take-off due to fog had made it impossible to
reach the briefed points at the previously planned times. The forma-
tion, however, flying in three-ship elements, was able to make good
the briefed points after allowing for the delay in take-off.

d. Division Assembly line:                 There was no division assembly. De-
parture from the coast was made from Clacton at an altitude of 10,000
feet. Close contact with Cycle relay was maintained. In accordance
with the instructions of cycle relay, a turn to the left of the
briefed course was made in mid-channel and bombs were dropped at
52°23’N - 02°55’E. It would have been impossible to have continued
the briefed route to the target and attacked as had previously been
planned.

e. Flight to base:            After releasing its bombs in the channel, the
formation took up a direct heading towards Felixstowe. After crossing
the coast, the formation flew directly to base, only to find the
weather conditions such that ships could not land. The formation
was diverted to Ridgewell and landed there at 1719.

3. Narrative: (Other attacking Aircraft)

a. Targets attacked: Sixteen aircraft of this group flew as high
squadron and two aircraft flew in the lead squadron (384^th Group).
The high squadron attacked the airfield at Biblis, Germany, while the
two aircraft flying with the lead squadron followed it on the attack
on Kaiserslautern. Three aircraft flew with the 401^st group and at-
tacked Koblenz, Germany. Two aircraft flying with the 91^st
group attacked Merzhausen, Germany. One aircraft flew with the 457^th
group and attacked Koblenz. Merzhausen was attacked by one aircraft
flying with the 303^rd group. Giessen was attacked by one aircraft
flying with the 305^th group and by one flying with the 306^th group.

b. Diversion bases:        Due to the extremely bad weather in the area
of the base, it was impossible to permit any of the aircraft to land
at base. As a result, all aircraft were diverted, forty-seven (47)
landing at Ridgewell, five (5) at Knettishall, and one (1) each at
Downham Market, Debach, and Castle Camp.

c. Description of the bombing run:                       The target at Biblis was at-
tacked by the 351^st high squadron flying on the lead squadron com-
posed of aircraft of the 384^th group and two ships from the 351^st
group. The high squadron attacked the assigned primary, with the
squadron lead bombardier performing his own sighting operation. The
briefed turn was made at he I.P. Airspeed on the bomb run was
slowed to 140 in order to stay behind the lead squadron. The C-1
pilot was not used.

d. Comments:                       No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were en-
countered. Reports from the aircraft attacking the various targets
indicated that flak was generally moderate and accurate. Good visual
bombing conditions prevailed over all of the targets bombed by this
group. All bombing was done visually and what PFF aircraft were
used, were used as navigational aids. Fighter support on this mission
was generally good.

NARRATIVE TELETYPE REPORT, MISSION OF 24 DEC., 1944, 351^ST BOMB GROUP

1. No leaflets were carried on today’s mission.

2. Sixteen A/C of this roup flew a high squadron and two A/C
flew in the lead squadron of a composite group which bombed
Biblis A/F in Germany. The high squadron dropped its entire
load on the A/F in an effort to post-hole the field. Based
on incomplete reports results of this bombing are poor with
the main pattern falling to the northwest of the field. The
two A/C flying with the lead squadron went on with that squad-
ron to bomb the secondary at Kaiserslautern M/Y. there are
no photographs of this bombing but visual observations indicate
good results. Eight of our A/C were scheduled to fly with
a group from Deenethorpe and three of these A/C plus one A/C
of this group which took off from Honington bombed the M/Y’s
at Koblenz with that group. Results of this bombing were un-
observed because of smoke in the area. There are no photo-
graphs. The other 5 A/C  joined other groups when they were
unable to form with Deenethorpe and bombed the following tar-
gets: three on Merzhausen A/F with appearantly very good re-
sults as per visual observations; and two on Giessen A/F also
with reported good results. There are no photographs of this
bombing. Two of our A/C flew with the 493^rd bomb group and
bombed the Frankfurt/Rhein Main A/F with good visual results reported.

3. No enemy A/C were encountered and no claims are being submitted.

4. The first flak encountered by our crews who flew to Biblis was
reported as scattered along the line from 5020N 0550E to 5013N
0621E; it was meager and accurate. There were various reports
of moderate accurate flak in the area Spa-Odighe-Julich. Moderate
accurate flak was encountered at Zell and Koblenz. There was
meager fairly accurate flak at Giessen and at the target (Biblis)
intense accurate flak was encountered in the vicinity of Worms
and North Mannheim. On the way out moderate accurate continuous
following was encountered along a line beginning in the vicinity
of Kaiserslautern and continuing approximately to 4905N 0742E.
Our planes that bombed Koblenz encountered meager to moderate
accurate flak at the target.

5. Good visual bombing conditions prevailed over all of the
targets bombed by this group.

6. There are no observations of military importance at this
time.

7. All bombing was done visually and what PFF A/C were used, were
used as navigational aids. Since none of our A/C led formations
which bombed targets no contact was made with the scouting
force. Fighter support for this mission was generally good.
None of our A/C was lost from the day’s operations.

379th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Group leader’s narrative – Lt.Col. Lewis E. Lyle.

TO:

1. LtCol. Lewis E. Lyle, leader of the 379^th lead squadron in
the 41^st “B”group on the mission to attack the airplane landing ground
at Merzhausen states, “thirty-eight of our aircraft took off in the 41^st
“B” group, including two spares. A/C 128 hit an obstruction while taking
off and was abortive. All of the aircraft of the group were diverted to
Mendlesham.

2. None of our aircraft is missing.

3. We could not see the runway so we took off on instruments and
broke out at 300 to 400 feet. We made our assembly without too much diffi-
culty and departed the field three minutes late. We got inside Molesworth
which we could see from the time we left the field.

4. We were in close formation all the way to the target. As we
were approaching the I.P. to our target I saw two fighters at about 30,000
feet, leaving very dense contrails behind them. They came on down past
us and were going faster than anything I have ever seen. They did not
shoot. I did get a good look at them, however, and they appeared to be
long nosed FW-190’s. Just a few minutes before that the 41^st “C” group
reported bandits in the area. Near the front lines, coming into the tar-
get, there was quite a bit of flak.

5. We had proper interval on the bomb run, which was made in trail
of the 41^st “A” group. All six of our squadrons got on the bomb run in
addition to one stray squadron. Everybody bombed within just a few seconds
of each other. The run was good and the weather was perfect. The target
was reported to have been blanketed with bomb bursts. I think our bombs
hit to the right of the aiming point. The other three squadrons reported
excellent bombing. There was no flak on the bomb run.

6. After the target we had some flak but due to evasive action we
suffered no damage in our formation. We also ran into some flak north of
Koblenz. We let down and made a much better ground speed than anticipated.
We asked what the weather was but Cycle wouldn’t tell us. The weather re-
ports were poor but we did get the general report that it wasn’t very good.
We asked if we were to be diverted and we were told to return to our bases
and circle our bunchers. Just before we reached the base we were told to
divert to Mendlesham. Just as we were getting this message verified on
VHF we received an RT message telling us to go to Grafton Underwood. As we
were circling to get into the pattern at Grafton Underwood we received
another message from Kimbolton on RT. We were told to proceed to Mendles-
ham. We landed at Mendlesham with a great amount of traffic which could
have been avoided if we would have been told to land there an hour before,
at which time we were right over that base. Landing was difficult.”

SUBJECT:     Squadron leader’s narrative – Captain Elmer S. Walker.

TO:

1. Captain Elmer S. Walker, leader of the 379^th high squadron in
the 41^st “C” group on the mission to attack the landing ground at Kirch
Gons states, twelve of our aircraft took off in the high squadron of
the “C” group. None of our aircraft was abortive. All of our planes
were diverted to Mendlesham.

2. None of our aircraft is missing.

3. The assembly was good, considering the circumstances. The for-
mation wasn’t too good. The route followed was as briefed.

4. We bombed the primary target visually. The ball turret gunner
reported that the bombs hit right in the middle of the airfield which was
our primary. Due to bomb rack malfunction some of our bombs remained
in the plane. Another airfield about 15 or twenty miles straight ahead
was chosen on which to drop these bombs. We dropped visually and good
hits on the airfield were observed. No flak was encountered at either of
the airfields.

5. Some flak was encountered at Bonn on the route out. The route
out was as briefed. The friendly fighter support was good.

6. It took quite a bit of time for us to find out where were to
land.

381^st BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operations report for mission of 24 December 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, 1^st combat bombardment wing, APO 557.

1. Summary of operations.
(1) Date of mission:                                24 December 1944.

(2) Target:                                                  Ettinghausen landing ground, Germany
Kirch Gons landing ground, Germany

(3) Units participating:                     Fifty-one A/C of this group were
scheduled and took off. Twelve plus one
PFF formed the lead squadron of the “A”
group of the 1^st CBW. Eleven plus one
spare plus one PFF formed the high squadron
of the “A” group of the 1^st CBW.
Eleven plus one spare plus one PFF formed
the high squadron of the “C” group of the
1^st CBW.

(a) Returned early:                                 A/C 42-107100. Returned early due to
internal failure of No.2 engine.

A/C 43-37561. Spare A/C

(b) Lost:                                                       None.

2. Narrative.

Take-off and assembly were made without incident. The course to the
target was flown as briefed. Excellent weather conditions prevailed all the
way to the target. Bombing was visual with very excellent results.

Flak was generally meagre and inaccurate except at St.Vith and Stavelot.
Route in and route out, where fairly accurate fire was encountered.

No enemy A/C were encountered. Friendly fighter support was excellent.

Communications were good.

384th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Concise narrative of 384^th bombardment group aircraft flying from
diverted bases on 24 December, 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, AAF station No.106, A.P.O. 557.

1. Major T.N. Hutchinson with twelve (12) of our aircraft who were
diverted to Horham on 23 December, 1944, took off from said base on 24
December, 1944, to form the lead squadron of the 13^th “F” group to attack
an airfield approximately six (6) miles northeast of Worms. All assemblies
were made normally and without difficulty. We left control point 1 on time,
but due to the fact that the division appeared to be flying at S.O.P. minus
10 on the route in, we were four (4) minutes late at control point 2 and
twelve (12) minutes late at control point 3. Due to this slow airspeed, the
division line got as far as eighteen (18) miles off course. On the route in,
we received moderate and very accurate flak at the front lines just north of
St Vith, moderate and very accurate flak at Giessen, and meager and accurate
flak at Billengen.

At the I.P. of the primary target, we started a visual bombing run.
However, although the target could be seen with the naked eye, thick haze plus
the fact that we were heading directly into the sun, prevented the bombardier
of picking up the target in his bombsight. We therefore turned off this
target and proceeded to the secondary target (Kaiserslautern M/Y, Germany).
Due to bas visibility and haze, we started a P.F.F. bombing run but approx.-
imately three (3) minutes before the target, it was picked up visually and
bombs were away at 1459 hours from 25,000 feet on a manetic heading of 167
degrees. Results were observed to be good. Weather over the target was
C.A.V.U. and we were engaged by moderate and very accurate anti-aircraft.

We made a left turn off the target and proceeded home about five (5)
miles right of course to stay out of propwash. No enemy opposition was
encountered on the route back, and we were not attackjed by enemy aircraft on
the entire mission. At the English coast, we contacted Cycle relay and they
advised us to return to our home buncher, which we did. We circled the buncher
a couple of times whereupon we were further advised that we were being diverted
to Sudbury. All of our aircraft landed at this base. A total of thirteen (13)
sorties were flown and all attacked the secondary target.

Fighter escort for this squadron was good on the entire mission.

2. Two (2) of our aircraft which were diverted to Ridgewell on 23
December, 1944, took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and attacked
the primary target (Steinback Airfield, Germany) with this group.

3. One (1) of our aircraft which was diverted to EYE on 23 December,
1944, took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and attacked the primary
target (Airfield three (3) miles south of Frankfurt, Germany) with this group.

4. One (1) of our aircraft which was diverted to Great Ashfield on 23
December, 1944, took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and proceeded to
assemble with aircraft of the 384^th bombardment group over our home base.
He filled in with the lead squadron of the 41^st “C” group and attacked the
primary target (Kirch Gons Airfield, Germany).

5. A total of seventeen (17) operational sorties were flown by aircraft
of the 384^th bombardment group from diverted bases on 24 December, 1944.

SUBJECT:     Air commander’s narrative, 41^st “C” group, for mission flown on
24 December, 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, AAF station No.106, A.P.O. 557.

The following is a dictated narrative by Major A.C. Strickland, 41^st “C”
group air commander plus additional statements by Captain C.M. Bishop, low
squadron leader for mission flown on 24 December, 1944:

1. Twenty-four (24) aircraft (no spares) of the 384^th bombardment group
took off between 1010 and 1054 hours to form the lead and low squadrons of
the 41^st “C” group to attack the Kirch Gons airfield, Germany. Each squadron
consisted of twelve (12) aircraft with no spares. The lead aircraft of these
two (2) squadrons were equipped with P.F.F. Aircraft from the 379^th bomb-
ardment group composed the high squadron of the 41^st “C” group. All navig-
ational data for this narrative was taken from the log of the group lead nav-
igator.

a.                    Number of A/C taking off (no spares):                    24 *1
Number of A/C attacking (any target):                  24 *1
Number of A/C not attacking                                       0
Number of A/C returned to bases in England:    24 *1
Number of A/C unaccounted for:                                0
Number of A/C known missing:                                    0
Number of sorties flown:                                            24 *1

b.                    Due to inclement weather, four (4) aircraft were forced to land away:
A/C 8027 (Capt. Bishop, low squadron Air Commander) landed away at Wratting
Common, one (1) aircraft landed away at Ridgewell, and two (2) aircraft landed
away at Sudbury.

2. None of our aircraft is missing.

3. Squadron and group assembly was accomplished without difficulty at
1204 hours, 51°41’N. -01°40’E. , 10,000 feet. Wing assembly was good and
accomplished over Halsted at 1143 hours, 10,000 feet. One (1) group of the
1^st combat wing did not arrive and we had to move up into #3 slot in
the division line instead of the briefed #4 position. We therefore departed
the English coast two (2) minutes late over Clacton at 1153 hours, 10,000 feet
where the division also assembled.

4. On the route out, climbs and air speeds were S.O.P. We crossed
the Belgian coast at 1228 hours, 51°09’N. -02°45’E. , 16,000 feet. The route
in was flown as briefed but we lost nine (9) minutes over the continent due
to a wind change. We encountered no flak on the route in and no enemy air-
craft were observed on the entire mission.

5. At the I.P. , the squadron took interval for a visual run as informed
by Buckeye-White. On the bomb run, two (2) squadrons of the 1^st combat wing
were criss-crossing our course giving us quite a bit of prop wash. One (1)
of these squadrons was on a heading of 60 degrees and we were flying an 80
degree course and were therefore flying a collision course. However, we did get
our bombs away visually at 1431 hours from 22,000 feet on an magnetic heading of
84 degrees. The primary target (Kirch Gons airfield, Germany) was attacked
with good results. Weather over the target was C.A.V.U. and we encountered
no flak.

Our low squadron also made a visual run releasing at 1431 hours from 21,100
feet on a magnetic heading of 80 degrees. Bombing results were good.

6. A very sharp left turn was made off the target and we immediately re-
assembled with our low squadron and slowed down to permit the high squadron to
catch up with us, however, they never did. We flew the briefed course back to
England without incident, departing the Belgian coast over Ostend at 1529 hours,
14,000 feet and recrossed the English coast over Felixstowe at 1553 hours, 5,000
feet. On the route back, we gained fifteen (15) minutes due to another shift
in winds.

7. Fighter escort was good on the entire mission. Buckeye-White notified
us that the primary target was open and could be bombed visually. This informa-
tion was accurate.

8. There are no further comments or suggestions.

(* A/C 8752 (Lt. Klatt, Pilot)  which landed away at Great Ashfield on 23 December,
1944, assembled and flew the entire mission with the 41^st “C” group. This makes
a total of twenty-five (25) aircraft of the 384^th bombardment group attacking
the primary target.)

SUBJECT:     Concise narrative of 384^th bombardment group aircraft flying from
diverted bases on 24 December, 1944.

TO:                 Commanding officer, AAF station No. 106, A.P.O. 557.

1. Major T.D. Hutchinson with twelve (12) of our aircraft who were
diverted to Horham on 23 December, 1944, took off from said base on 24
December, 1944, to form the lead squadron of the 13^th “F” group to attack
an airfield approximately six (6) miles northeast of Worm. All assemblies
were made normally and without difficulty. We left control point 1 on time,
but due to the fact that the divisions appeared to be flying at S.O.P. minus
10 on the route in, we were four (4) minutes late at control point 2 and
twelve (12) minutes late at control point 3. Due to this slow airspeed, the
division line got as far as eighteen (18) miles off course. On the route in,
we received moderate and very accurate flak at the front lines just north of
St.Vith, moderate and very accurate flak at Giessen, and meager and accurate
flak at Billengen.

At the I.P. of the primary target, we started a visual bombing run.
However, although the target could be seen with the naked eye, thick haze plus
the fact that we were heading directly into the sun, prevented the bombardier
of picking up the target in his bombsight. We therefore turned off this
target and proceeded to the secondary target (Kaiserslautern M/Y, Germany).
Due to bas visibility and haze, we started a P.F.F. bombing run but approx.-
imately three (3) minutes before the target, it was picked up visually and
bombs were away at 1459 hours from 25,000 feet on a magnetic heading of 167
degrees. Results were observed to be good. Weather over the target was
C.A.V.U. and we were engaged by moderate and very accurate anti-aircraft.

We made a left turn off the target and proceeded home about five (5)
miles right of course to stay out of prop wash. No enemy opposition was
encountered on the route back, and we were not attacked by enemy aircraft on
the entire mission. At the English coast, we contacted Cycle Relay and they
advised us to return to our home buncher, which we did. We circled the buncher
a couple of times whereupon we were further advised that we were being diverted
to Sudbury. All of our aircraft landed safely at this base. A total of thirteen (13)
sorties were flown and all attacked the secondary target.

Fighter escort for this squadron was good on the entire mission.

2. Two (2) of our aircraft which were diverted to Ridgewell on 23
December, 1944 , took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and attacked
the primary target (Steinback Airfield, Germany) with this group.|

3. One (1) of our aircraft which was diverted to Eye on 23 December,
1944, took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and attacked the primary
target (Airfield three (3) miles south of Frankfurt, Germany) with this group.

4. One (1) of our aircraft which was diverted to Great Ashfield on 23
December, 1944, took off from said base on 24 December, 1944 and proceeded to
assemble with aircraft of the 384^th bombardment group over our base.
he filled in with the lead squadron of the 41^st “C” group and attacked the
primary target (Kirch Gons airfield, Germany).

5. A total of seventeen (17) operational sorties were flown by aircraft
of the 384^th bombardment group from diverted bases on 24 December, 1944.

398^th BG

General narrative

SUBJECT:     Operations officer’s report of mission on 24 December 1944

TO:                 Commanding General, first bombardment division, APO 557
Commanding General, 1^st combat bombardment wing, APO 557.

1. Summary of operations:

A. Data:

(1) Date of mission:                                24 December 1944
(2) Target assigned:                               Koblenz, Germany (“B” group)
Kirch Gons, Germany (Comp. Sqn)
(3) Target attacked:                               Koblenz, Germany (“B” group)
Kirch Gons, Germany (Comp. Sqn)
(4) Units participating:                    53 A/C of this group including
5 PFF A/C, formed the 1^st “B” CBG
and low Sqn. of comp. “C” Gp.
(5) Returned early:                                 None
(6) Failed to take-ff:                            None
(7) Lost:                                                       42-97374, 42-102536 crashed on
take-off.

2. Narrative

Lead squadron, 1^st “B” CBG

40 Aircraft scheduled from this field as 1^st “B” group to hit airfield at
Ettinghausen. Lead and deputy lead aircraft take-off was difficult due to ground
fog. Remaining aircraft were held on ground due to third aircraft crashing on end
of runway. Formation was finally assembled late and information was received from
1 CBW through VHF to use “B” plan attacking target at Koblenz.
Route to target was flown as briefed. 38 aircraft attacked primary visual
target with results good, good and poor. No enemy fighters encountered
Fighter support was poor.
Flak was moderate but very accurate and was encountered from I.P. to target
approximately 20 minutes.
Route home was flown as briefed. Formation was diverted to Rattlesden
and Ridgewell and landing was without event.
One bombardier was killed and one crew member injured due to flak.

Low squadron, 1^st “B” CBG

Take-off was made on instruments. Climb was made as briefed, and at the
assembly buncher, information was given that the remainder of the formation would
be slow taking off. Because of the delay in assembly, plan “B” was flown.
Plan “B” was flown as briefed. The low squadron took interval behind the
lead squadron. The top turret gunner was instructed to flash an aldis lamp to the
deputy at “Bombs away.” At approximately two minutes before bombs away, the deputy
leader mistook the sun reflecting on the aldis lamp for the signal. The deputy
dropped his bomb short, and the remainder of the squadron, with the exception of
the lead aircraft, dropped on the deputy. The lead aircraft dropped on the assigned
target.
Moderate and accurate flak was encountered at frequent intervals from
approximately 38 miles before the I.P. to past the target. No enemy aircraft were
sighted.
Fighter support was fair.
Return was as briefed. The base was closed in upon return. Aircraft were
diverted to Rattlesden and all landed safely. No aircraft in the low squadron was
lost on the mission; one aircraft crashed on take-off.

High squadron, 1^st “B” CBG

Take-off was made on instruments after slight delay. After lead aircraft took
off, and a few wing aircraft, there was a delay of about an hour due to two aircraft
cracking up on take-off. Assembly was satisfactory. The formation left the
buncher with 12 aircraft. One aircraft caught the formation. The other had cracked
upon take-off. He was low low element lead. The number 4 aircraft in the low
element took over the low low lead. 13 aircraft hit the target.
After the lead aircraft took off, the mission was changed to plan “B”. The
mission was flown as briefed except that all control points were reached late.
Bombing was visual, but to right of MPI.
Scattered, accurate flak was encountered going into both I.P. and target.
No enemy aircraft were encountered.
No aircraft were lost due to enemy opposition.
Landing was made at Ridgewell due to adverse weather conditions at home
base.

Composite low squadron, 1^st “C” CBG

Take-off was made entirely on instruments but without incident to this
squadron. Assembly was made at Bassingbourn and was fair.
Departed Bassingbourn on time and on course with seven aircraft.
Departed control point #1 4 minutes late but on course and with eight
aircraft.
Route in was flown as briefed.
Bombing was visual with excellent results.
Route out was flown as briefed.
Landing was made at Ridgewell due to weather.
Five aircraft attacked with other squadron. No aircraft were lost.
Flak was meager and inaccurate.
No enemy aircraft were sighted.
Fighter support was excellent.
Weather was better than briefed.

401^st BG

General narrative

Mission 183 (Part I – 94^th “B” formation)                                    Date 24 December 1944

Assignment

1. Assigned target:         Koblenz, Germany (Plan “B”)

2. Commitments:                The 401^st group was to furnish a complete 36 A/C group
for the 94^th “B” group formation. A PFF A/C was to be included
in each squadron and as many spares as available.

Execution

1. Target bombed:            Koblenz, M/Y Germany (vis)

2. a   Group leader:         1^st Lt. M.J. Christensen (Major Chapman aborted)
Lead navigator:   1^st Lt. P.J. King (Howard “Mickey”)
Lead bombardier: 1^st Lt. M.E. McClendon

b   Low Sqdn leader:   1^st Lt R.M. Fowler (Keeling)
Lead navigator:   1^st Lt. J.M. Rush (Peterson “Mickey”)
Lead bombardier: 1^st Lt. M.M. Scanlon

c   High Sqdn leader: 1^st Lt. C.W. Utter
Lead navigator:   1^st Lt. R. Damp
Lead bombardier: 1^st Lt. J.F. Hope

3. Flight over England:

a. Take-off:

Take-off was delayed 10 minutes because of dense fog: opened to about
1 mile and take-off proceeded normally. Thirty two aircraft took off ( incl.
a borrowed A/C from 384^th roup) from home base and five A/C from other
fields were to join the formation on route.

b. Squadron and group assemblies:

Squadron and group assemblies were effected very rapidly but by time
to depart “Y” the group had 36 A/C. At this time “Newflick 3” called and
said to delay 45 minutes and proceed on plan “B”. after delaying 45 min.
group departed with 39 A/C on plan “B”, including six A/C from other groups.

3. c. Route over England:

After departing buncher the 94^th “B” group was joined by 8 A/C of
94^th “A”. At CP #1 the 94^th “B” and “A” were joined by 1^st B group which
decided to follow 94^th “B” into the alternate target. The three groups
94^th “B”, 94^th “A’, 1^st B were in compact column at departure of CP #1,
45 minutes late as briefed.

4. Attack:

a. flight to target:

94^th “B” was leading the column proceeding to the alternate target
(Koblenz) and a very good formation was maintained and the briefed course
flown until the lead A/C aborted 150 miles from target, altitude
21,000’ (4,000’ below bombing altitude). When lead aborted, high sqdn
leader was called to take over lead of group. High squadron leader
dropped his wheels and started down only to find entire squadron following
him. VHF contact couldn’t be made with deputy. High squadron lead took
over lead of the resulting 2 squadron combination. Lead and high squadron
formation to the target was very poor. Due to mechanical difficulties
and flak evasion, course was not as briefed from I.P. to target.

b. bombing run:

Lead & high squadron:

After the group lead had changed hands, the high squadron leader
took over a little while before the I.P. Arrived about 3 miles north of
assigned I.P. and soon thereafter encountered intense accurate flak. Evasive
action was used to the left and the group started on a visual bomb run 35°
off briefed Mag. heading. The bombardier synchronized on the M.P.I. and then
employed evasive action. When he placed sight on back of target to refine
corrections he found sight had become disengaged from the stabilizer. Since
there was no time to replace the pin he held the sight on target with his
right hand and made small corrections through C-1 with his left. When the
indices crossed he salvoed. All other A/C used a 75’ inter setting.
The high squadron bombed on the group leader. Strikes were seen in the
target area.

Low squadron:

Before I.P. was reached were north of course but turning just
prior to the I.P., the I.P. was made good – almost. During the run this box
had to “S” so as to get behind the lead – after zigzagging down the run,
the target was sighted – the river being the identifying check point. Be-
fore the actual bomb run started the nose was hot by flak and seemed to
affect the operatiom of the C-1, so it was turned off and a P.D.I. run was
made. At bombs away only the smoke marker and 1 bomb went out, however,
it is thought that most of the ships dropped on the smoke bomb. Repeated
attempts to salvo had no effect, finally the pilot’s salvo switch worked,
approximately a minute after bombs away. Synchronization appeared good.
unable to explain why bombs wouldn’t go.

4. c. Flight from target:

South of course after leaving target. Returned to course an returned
as briefed. Received diversion message over channel to land at Lavenham.

d. Return to base:

All ships landed at Lavenham safely – no ships of this formation landed
at home base.

e. Weather:

CAVU over target with Cirrus above 27,000’. Ground haze was prevalent.
Visibility on take-off practically nil.

f. Fighter support:

Two flights of P-51’s met the formation about 75 miles from I.P. and
left immediately. No further support.

g. Comments on formation:

Very poor after lead aborted. Lead squadron scattered and high
followed leader down when lead was changed. Low squadron good throughout.
During assembly and until lead aborted formation was very good.

h. Conclusions and recommendations:

Fly deputy PFF in #2 position, lead squadron.

i. Other A/C taking off for mission:

The following A/C were scheduled for the high squadron but due to the
fact that all but one took off from other bases they were not able to
reach 94^th “B” formation.

A/C 44-6132:                     Took off from RAF field Gaydon, but due to fact that
nothing other than practise bombs could be loaded, returned
early to base.

A/C 42-97395:                    Took off with 401^st BG but failed to find formation. It
tacked onto 401^st BG A/C flying with 452^nd BG in
3^rd DIV. It bombed Darmstadt A/D dropping 12 x 500#
M17 IB.

A/C 43-38738:                    Took off from Harrington to join 401^st BG but failed to
reach 94^th “B” formation. It bombed Giessen A/D with
34 x 100# GP’s.

A/C 42-97322:                   Took off from Harrington to join 401^st BG but failed to
reach 94^th “B” formation and tacked onto 303^rd group
formation. It bombed Darmstadt A/D with 34 x 100# GP’s.

A/C 44-6313:                      Was scheduled to take-off from Polebrook but was unable to
do so because field was closed. It joined the 351^st group
on the afternoon mission and was recalled with the formation.

A/C 43-38656:                    Took off from Wendling to join 401^st  but failed to
reach formation. It flew and bombed with 379^th group.
dropping 8 x 500# GP bombs on Freiburg

5. Aircraft not attacking:

Lead squadron: PFF A/C 44-8033       Not sortie. Returned after reaching
continent because of internal failure of
#2 engine.

A/C T/O from other fields:

A/C 44-6132:                     Not sortie. Took off from RAF field Gaydon, but due to
the fact that nothing but practise bombs could be loaded,
it returned early to base.

A/C 44-6313:                      Not sortie. Was scheduled to take-off from Polebrook but was
unable to do so because field was closed. It joined the
351^st group on the afternoon mission and was recalled with
that formation.

6. Enemy opposition:

No air opposition seen or encountered. (see flak report for flak)

7. Battle damage:

Major            Minor           To flak
1                    21                    22

8. Casualties:

1 – DOA

9. Statistical summary of operations (see attached form)

10. Bombing date:

a. observatios:

Bombs were seen to strike in the target areag.

b. Disposition of bombs:

Lead squadron:                11 A/C of the original lead squadron EET and bombed Koblenz,
dropping 132 x 500# M-12 GP bombs. The aborting A/C 033
returned 11 bombs to base.

low squadron:                  12 A/C of the low squadron EET and bombed Koblenz, dropping
143 500# M-12 GP bombs.

High squadron:                8 A/C of the original high squadron EET and bombed Koblenz,
dropping 67 x 500# IB’s – 8 x 500# M-12 (in GH A/C) – 10
x 500# GP (loaded in A/C 125 at Shipdam)

Other A/C:                           See paragraph 4 (i).

e. Tabular summary of disposition of bombs:

Aircraft                                                     Bombs
Over          Bomb-                     Num                                            Fusing
target         ing ber         size           type       nose     tail

Main Bombfall                                31                  31                        (281        500#           M-12      1/100   1/100
( 79         500#           M-17IB        33 sec.

Other attacks                                   4                    4                         see paragraph 4i)

Total bombs on target                                                                         (281        500#           M-12      1/100   1/100
( 79         500#           M-17IB        33 sec.

Other expenditures                                                                              -              -                -               -           -

Bombs returned                                                                                         11         500#           M-12      1/100   1/100

Total (loaded on A/C taking off)                                                     292         500#           M-12      1/100   1/100
79          500#           M-17IB         33 sec.

11. Lost aircraft: None.

MISSION #183 (Part II – squadron mission with 3^rd division)

Assignment

1. Assigned target:         Darmstadt A/G (Pri) or M/Y (sec)

2. Commitments:                The 401^st group was top furnish all available A/C at
Deopham Green to participate in the mission with the 452^nd
group of the 3^rd division. 15 A/C were available and flew the
high squadron of the 452^nd group formation.

Execution

1. Target bombed:            Darmstadt (M/Y – Vis)

2. Squadron leader:       Capt. D.A. Currie
Lead navigator:         Capt. W.B. Raberer
Mickey operator:       1^st Lt. F.P. Fraoili
Lead bombardier:       Capt. W.T. Hutsch

3. Flight over England:

a. Take-off:
Take-off was made at 0840. 15 A/C taking off normally and satisfactorily.

b. Squadron and group assemblies:

The squadron leader assembled the squadron over the buncher at Deopham
Green at 17,000’. After making four 360° turns the squadron was assembled
and it joined the group formation.

d. Route over England:

Route over England was as briefed as far as is known. The group
and wing falling into good division column.

4. Attack:

a. Flight to target:

Flight to target was as briefed except the group lead ship was off
course to the left part of the time. The group leader instructed 2 of
the high squadron A/C to come into the lead squadron’s formation. This left
13 401^st A/C in the high squadron for the balance of the flight. The
lead and low squadrons bombed the primary whereas the high bombed the
secondary target.

b. Bombing run:

The squadron turned on I.P. as briefed and started bomb run without
interference. There being such a ground fog and the run being into the
sun the run started on Mickey. Not being able to see the primary target
due to ground fog a run was made on secondary target. About thirty
seconds before bombs away the bombardier was able to make a few minor
corrections. Bombs were dropped on the secondary target PFF with visual assist,
squadron leader salvoed, all others used min. intervalometer setting.

4. Flight from target:

The rally was made very quickly and once in group formation the high
squadron stayed there till it was over the channel.

d. Return to base:

Return was uneventful. The high squadron leader broke off from the
group and returned to Deopham Green. The rest of the high squadron was
supposed to return to base but were unable to do so and landed at other
bases – safely.

e. Weather:

Weather was as briefed. Clear over the continent with haze over
the target.

f. Fighter support:

Good.

g. Comments on formation:

Formation was best in a long time. Very good.

5. Aircaft not attacking:

None – all attacked.

6. Enemy opposition:

No air opposition was seen or encountered. Some meager but exceedingly
accurate flak was encountered over battle line – not at target.

7. Battle damage:

(Included in Part I of mission summary)

8. Casualties:

None.

9. Statistical summary of operations:                (see attached form)

10. Bombing data:

a. Observations:

Bombing was mostly unobserved.

b. Disposition of bombs:

15 A/C EET and bombed Darmstadt ( 2 on the A/C, 13 on the M/Y) and
dropped 180 x 500# M-17 IB thereupon.

c. Tabular summary of disposition of bombs:

Aircraft                                                     Bombs
Over          Bomb-                     Num                                            Fusing
target         ing ber         size           type       nose     tail

Main Bombfall (sec. M/Y)              13                  13                       156        500#           M-17IB

Other attacks (Pri. A/D)               2                    2                         24         500#           M-17IB

Total bombs on target                                                                         180        500#          M-17IB

Other expenditures                                                                              -              -                -               -           -

Bombs returned                                                                                       -              -                -               -           -

Total (loaded on A/C taking off)                                                     180         500#           M-17IB

11. Lost aircraft: None.

Illegible.