# 401st BG

### General narrative

Mission 183 (Part I - 94 "B" formation)

Date 24 December 1944

### Assignment

- 1. Assigned target: Koblenz, Germany (Plan "B")
- 2. Commitments: The 401\* group was to furnish a complete 36 A/C group for the 94\* "B" group formation. A PFF A/C was to be included in each squadron and as many spares as available.

#### Execution

1. Target bombed: Koblenz, M/Y Germany (vis)

2. a Group leader: l. Lt. M.J. Christensen (Major Chapman aborted)
Lead navigator: l. Lt. P.J. King (Howard "Mickey")

Lead bombardier: 1. Lt. M.E. McClendon

b Low Sqdn leader: 1- Lt R.M. Fowler (Keeling)

Lead navigator: l. Lt. J.M. Rush (Peterson "Mickey")

Lead bombardier: 1. Lt. M.M. Scanlon

c High Sqdn leader: l. Lt. C.W. Utter Lead navigator: l. Lt. R. Damp Lead bombardier: l. Lt. J.F. Hope

3. Flight over England:

a. Take-off:

Take-off was delayed 10 minutes because of dense fog: opened to

about

1 mile and take-off proceeded normally. Thirty two aircraft took off (

incl.

a borrowed A/C from  $384^{11}$  roup) from home base and five A/C from other fields were to join the formation on route.

b. Squadron and group assemblies:

Squadron and group assemblies were effected very rapidly but by

time

to depart "Y" the group had 36 A/C. At this time "Newflick 3" called and said to delay 45 minutes and proceed on plan "B". after delaying 45 min. group departed with 39 A/C on plan "B", including six A/C from other groups.

3. c. Route over England:

After departing buncher the 94. "B" group was joined by 8 A/C of 94. "A". At CP #1 the 94. "B" and "A" were joined by 1. B group which decided to follow 94. "B" into the alternate target. The three groups 94. "B", 94. "A', 1. B were in compact column at departure of CP #1, 45 minutes late as briefed.

- 4. Attack:
- a. flight to target:

94" "B" was leading the column proceeding to the alternate target (Koblenz) and a very good formation was maintained and the briefed course

flown until the lead A/C aborted 150 miles from target, altitude 21,000' (4,000' below bombing altitude). When lead aborted, high sqdn leader was called to take over lead of group. High squadron leader dropped his wheels and started down only to find entire squadron following

him. VHF contact couldn't be made with deputy. High squadron lead took over lead of the resulting 2 squadron combination. Lead and high squadron

formation to the target was very poor. Due to mechanical difficulties and flak evasion, course was not as briefed from I.P. to target.

b. bombing run:

Lead & high squadron:

After the group lead had changed hands, the high squadron leader took over a little while before the I.P. Arrived about 3 miles north of assigned I.P. and soon thereafter encountered intense accurate flak.

Evasive

action was used to the left and the group started on a visual bomb run 35° off briefed Mag. heading. The bombardier synchronized on the M.P.I. and

then
employed evasive action. When he placed sight on back of target to refine
corrections he found sight had become disengaged from the stabilizer.

Since

there was no time to replace the pin he held the sight on target with his right hand and made small corrections through C-1 with his left. When

the

indices crossed he salvoed. All other A/C used a 75' inter setting. The high squadron bombed on the group leader. Strikes were seen in the target area.

Low squadron:

Before I.P. was reached were north of course but turning just prior to the I.P., the I.P. was made good - almost. During the run this box had to "S" so as to get behind the lead - after zigzagging down the run, the target was sighted - the river being the identifying check point. Before the actual bomb run started the nose was hot by flak and seemed to affect the operatiom of the C-l, so it was turned off and a P.D.I. run was made. At bombs away only the smoke marker and 1 bomb went out, however, it is thought that most of the ships dropped on the smoke bomb. Repeated attempts to salvo had no effect, finally the pilot's salvo switch worked, approximately a minute after bombs away. Synchronization appeared

good.

unable to explain why bombs wouldn't go.

4. c. Flight from target:

South of course after leaving target. Returned to course an returned

as briefed. Received diversion message over channel to land at Lavenham.

d. Return to base:

All ships landed at Lavenham safely - no ships of this formation landed

at home base.

e. Weather:

CAVU over target with Cirrus above 27,000'. Ground haze was prevalent.

Visibility on take-off practically nil.

f. Fighter support:

Two flights of P-51's met the formation about 75 miles from I.P. and left immediately. No further support.

g. Comments on formation:

Very poor after lead aborted. Lead squadron scattered and high followed leader down when lead was changed. Low squadron good throughout.

During assembly and until lead aborted formation was very good.

h. Conclusions and recommendations:

Fly deputy PFF in #2 position, lead squadron.

i. Other A/C taking off for mission:

The following A/C were scheduled for the high squadron but due to the

fact that all but one took off from other bases they were not able to reach  $94^{\circ}$  "B" formation.

A/C 44-6132: Took off from RAF field Gaydon, but due to fact that nothing other than practise bombs could be loaded, returned

early to base.

A/C 42-97395: Took off with 401-BG but failed to find formation. It tacked onto 401-BG A/C flying with 452-BG in 3-DIV. It bombed Darmstadt A/D dropping 12 x 500#M17 IB.

A/C 43-38738: Took off from Harrington to join 401 BG but failed

reach 94 "B" formation. It bombed Giessen A/D with  $34 \times 100 \#$  GP's.

A/C 42-97322:Took off from Harrington to join 401\* BG but failed to reach 94\* "B" formation and tacked onto 303\* group formation. It bombed Darmstadt A/D with 34 x 100# GP's.

A/C 44-6313: Was scheduled to take-off from Polebrook but was unable to do so because field was closed. It joined the 351 group on the afternoon mission and was recalled with the

formation.

to

A/C 43-38656:Took off from Wendling to join 401 but failed to reach formation. It flew and bombed with 379 group. dropping 8 x 500# GP bombs on Freiburg

5. Aircraft not attacking:

Lead squadron: PFF A/C 44-8033 Not sortie. Returned after reaching continent because of internal failure of #2 engine.

A/C T/O from other fields:

A/C 44-6132: Not sortie. Took off from RAF field Gaydon, but due to the fact that nothing but practise bombs could be loaded, it returned early to base.

A/C 44-6313: Not sortie. Was scheduled to take-off from Polebrook but

was

unable to do so because field was closed. It joined the  $351^{2}$  group on the afternoon mission and was recalled with that formation.

## 6. Enemy opposition:

No air opposition seen or encountered. (see flak report for flak)

## 7. Battle damage:

8. Casualties:

1 - DOA

- 9. Statistical summary of operations (see attached form)
- 10. Bombing date:
- a. observatios:

Bombs were seen to strike in the target areag.

b. Disposition of bombs:

Lead squadron: 11 A/C of the original lead squadron EET and bombed Koblenz,

dropping 132 x 500# M-12 GP bombs. The aborting A/C 033 returned 11 bombs to base.

low squadron: 12 A/C of the low squadron EET and bombed Koblenz, dropping

143 500# M-12 GP bombs.

High squadron: 8 A/C of the original high squadron EET and bombed Koblenz,

dropping 67 x 500# IB's - 8 x 500# M-12 (in GH A/C) - 10 x 500# GP (loaded in A/C 125 at Shipdam)

Other A/C: See paragraph 4 (i).

## e. Tabular summary of disposition of bombs:

	Aircraft			Bombs		_	
	Over target	Bomb- ing	Num ber	size	<b>ty</b> pe	Fusi:	ng tail
Main Bombfall	31	31	(281 (79	500# 500#	M-12 M-17IB		1/100 sec.
Other attacks	4	4		see parag	raph 4i)		
Total bombs on target			(281 ( <b>7</b> 9	500# 500#	M-12 M-17IB	1/100 33 :	1/100 sec.
Other expenditures			-	-	-	-	-
Bombs returned			11	500#	M-12	1/100	1/100

292 500# 79 500#

M-12 1/100 1/100 M-17IB 33 sec.

#### 11. Lost aircraft: None.

## MISSION #183 (Part II - squadron mission with 3ddivision)

#### Assignment

- 1. Assigned target: Darmstadt A/G (Pri) or M/Y (sec)
- 2. Commitments: The 401<sup>\*</sup> group was top furnish all available A/C at Deopham Green to participate in the mission with the 452<sup>\*</sup> group of the 3<sup>\*</sup> division. 15 A/C were available and flew the high squadron of the 452<sup>\*</sup> group formation.

#### Execution

- 1. Target bombed: Darmstadt (M/Y Vis)
- 2. Squadron leader: Capt. D.A. Currie Lead navigator: Capt. W.B. Raberer Mickey operator: Lt. F.P. Fraoili Lead bombardier: Capt. W.T. Hutsch
- 3. Flight over England:
- a. Take-off:

Take-off was made at 0840. 15 A/C taking off normally and satisfactorily.

b. Squadron and group assemblies:

 $\hbox{ The squadron leader assembled the squadron over the buncher at } \\ \hbox{ Deopham}$ 

Green at 17,000'. After making four 360° turns the squadron was assembled and it joined the group formation.

d. Route over England:

Route over England was as briefed as far as is known. The group and wing falling into good division column.

- 4. Attack:
- a. Flight to target:

Flight to target was as briefed except the group lead ship was off course to the left part of the time. The group leader instructed 2 of the high squadron A/C to come into the lead squadron's formation. This

left

13 401. A/C in the high squadron for the balance of the flight. The lead and low squadrons bombed the primary whereas the high bombed the secondary target.

b. Bombing run:

interference. There being such a ground fog and the run being into the sun the run started on Mickey. Not being able to see the primary target due to ground fog a run was made on secondary target. About thirty seconds before bombs away the bombardier was able to make a few minor

corrections. Bombs were dropped on the secondary target PFF with visual assist,

squadron leader salvoed, all others used min. intervalometer setting.

4. Flight from target:

The rally was made very quickly and once in group formation the high squadron stayed there till it was over the channel.

d. Return to base:

Return was uneventful. The high squadron leader broke off from

the

group and returned to Deopham Green. The rest of the high squadron was supposed to return to base but were unable to do so and landed at other bases - safely.

e. Weather:

Weather was as briefed. Clear over the continent with haze over the target.

f. Fighter support:

Good.

g. Comments on formation:

Formation was best in a long time. Very good.

5. Aircaft not attacking:

None - all attacked.

6. Enemy opposition:

No air opposition was seen or encountered. Some meager but exceedingly

accurate flak was encountered over battle line - not at target.

7. Battle damage:

(Included in Part I of mission summary)

8. Casualties:

None.

- 9. Statistical summary of operations: (see attached form)
- 10. Bombing data:
- a. Observations:

Bombing was mostly unobserved.

b. Disposition of bombs:

15 A/C EET and bombed Darmstadt ( 2 on the A/C, 13 on the M/Y) and dropped 180 x 500# M-17 IB thereupon.

c. Tabular summary of disposition of bombs:

	Aircraft Over Bomb- Ni		Nam	Bombs			Fusing	
	Over target	ing	ber	size	type	nose	tail	
Main Bombfall (sec. M/Y)	13	13	156	500#	M-17IB			
Other attacks (Pri. A/D)	2	2	24	500#	M-17IB			
Total bombs on target			180	500#	M-17IB			
Other expenditures			_	_	-	-	_	
Bombs returned			-	_	-	-	_	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)			180	500#	M-17I	В		

# 11. Lost aircraft: None.